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ABSTRACT

The notion of a “feminine” style has been staunchly resisted by third-wave
feminists who argue that to posit a “feminine” style is essentialist. Yet, linguists
such as Norma Mendoza-Denton and Elinor Ochs discuss indexicality and
shifting through salient variables, a process called entextualization. Further,
French feminists such as Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva use the linguistic
concept of intertextuality to explain certain poetic uses of language that might
cause what Luce Irigaray calls “irruption of the semiotic chora”—moments within
language where boundaries in the semiotic chain of signification are “blurred.”
Thus, while current feminism has moved strictly away from the idea that there is
an exigent “feminine” to which all women must aspire, there exists a tenuous, but
salient connection between the linguistic concepts of indexicality and
intertextuality on one hand, and jouissance and “irruption of the chora” on the
other that can inform those styles we might term “feminine” and allow for a more
productive and responsive perception of “femininity.”
Amos’ lyrics illustrate these theories working together; Amos’ lyrics
represent such a “feminine” style as indexed through use of salient variables;
thus, Amos’ lyrics represent a sociolinguistic phenomenon wherein gender-based
salient variables reform what “feminine” is and means, challenging social
attitudes and the specular feminine persona within both the personal and public
spheres. The implications of these theories could eventually influence
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perceptions of women in any particular profession or sphere, as gendered
linguistic markers influence gender roles and implications, which, in turn, inform
social change.
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CHAPTER ONE
THEORY

What is gender? Does it reside in the body? In biology? What about a
“feminine style”? Does a quantifiable feminine style exist? Is it possible to write or
read or think in a “feminine” way if gender is, as sociolinguists and body theorists
argue, a societal construct that is “‘always contestable’” (“You Da Man,” Bucholtz
444)? Radical French feminist theorists such as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray
and linguists such as Julia Kristeva argue that there are feminine linguistic traits
and feminine ways of communicating which favor duplicity, complexity, and
subjectivity in meaning. While current feminism tends to leave the thought of a
definable “feminine” in the past, Judith Butler posits that the materiality of the
body and its conception as feminine can inform our reading of literature and
society, allowing us to see and contest the ways in which we reiterate any
particular gender, expressly femininity.
Specifically, the French feminist idea of a “feminine” language—a
language that would defy “patrilinear” rules of language use—heavily implies
social and linguistic language change. Singer/songwriter Tori Amos’ oeuvre
indexes just such a dissonant “feminine” identity through a “double-voicing”
similar to that mentioned by Bucholtz (“You Da Man” 450), wherein the identity of
1

the “hegemonic masculine” is referenced, called to task, and refuted. Might we
learn—by analysis of texts identified as puzzlingly, yet pleasingly “feminine” in
style—more about the ways in which women might index their status as
“speaking subjects” and contest their relationship to hegemonic femininity? What
changes must be made to our ideas (even some of those ideas held by women
about themselves and other women) of “femininity” in order to reclaim it from
hegemony? Can women identify a new genre of “feminine” that is not “less” and
“lack”?

An Overview of the Specular and Textual Pleasure
Second-wave feminist theory has been criticized for its tendency to
generalize too much; scholars and laypersons alike are averse to any idea that
gender is something that can be quantified or “essentialized.” According to
Christina Hughes, second-wave feminism’s treatment of women as a “unitary
category” ignored certain differences between women (10). In addition, thirdwave feminism sees second-wave feminism as ignoring its own very white,
heterosexual middle-class view of feminism and its privileges. Hughes notes that
identity politics, beginning in the 1980’s, especially called for a revision to
second-wave’s Western, heteronormative assumptions (10). French feminist
theories of gender and language have been seen as falling into the same
essentialist loop; however, some French feminist theory, such as Julia Kristeva’s
use of jouissance, which may shed some light on current linguistic and identity
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theories related to identity and style construction.
According to Nikki Sullivan, “identity politics …could be said to be based
on the assumption that sexual inclinations, practices, and desires are the
expression of a person’s core identity” (81). But because, as Sullivan and others
argue, identity is a social construct, gender is, as Simone de Beauvoir asserts, a
“learned set of attributes and actions” (qtd. in Sullivan 81) which is constructed
for the speaker, rather than by the speaker. According to Judith Butler, “(g)ender
is the performative effect of reiterative acts…which are repeated in and through a
highly rigid regulatory frame, (and which) ‘congeal over time to produce the
appearance of a substance, of a natural sort of being’” (qtd. in Sullivan 82).
Thus, linguists perceive identity as indexed through linguistic means,
through what Penelope Eckert calls “stylistic moves” (458). Butler, too, argues
that “(i)dentity categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether
as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures, or as the rallying points
for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression” (qtd. in Sullivan 82). So,
French feminist theory and linguistic theory have—unknowingly, it seems—
danced around each other for the last fifty years or so, both referring to elements
of language based in intertextuality and finally resting on linguistic change made
through purposeful use of language.
According to third-wave feminists and linguists, gender is not an
“essential” quality, but rather a societal construct that is “always contestable,”
because, as Mary Bucholtz (and others such as Norma Mendoza-Denton)
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suggests, “local forms creatively respond to dominant ideologies rather than
mechanically reflecting them” (“You Da Man” 444). Bucholtz posits that race and
gender are both constructed “in the narrative choices of the storytellers” (“You Da
Man” 445). Thus, this view of gender sees it as the process and the product of a
collective narrative. Similarly moving beyond the idea of a feminine “essence,”
body theorists such as Judith Butler argue that gender is contextual, and,
therefore, resists definition (54-55). Linguistic theorists, too, assert the contextual
nature of gender construction. In this thesis, I will demonstrate, using a particular
site of language, that a very tenuous, but salient, resonance exists between
current feminist, linguistic, and body theory on one hand, and the French
“essentialist” feminists (or second-wave “cultural” feminists), on the other—
namely, the lyrics of musician Tori Amos, which are complex and “baffling” in the
very style of Helene Cixous’ “The Laugh of the Medusa.”

Foreground: Identity Through Stylistic Moves
Linguists have discussed gender as a phenomenon that is styled (i.e.,
constructed and refuted) by language and other “effortful” activities (Eckert 469).
Elinor Ochs observes that “gender ideologies are socialized, sustained, and
transformed through talk, particularly through verbal practices that recur
innumerable times in the lives of members of social groups,” referring to
Althusser’s and Pascal’s ideas that human subjectivity is based in human action
(336). Indeed, language is widely discussed in the field of linguistics as a
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positioning of the self, the subject, through what Ochs calls “stances” and other
“social acts” (337). For example, a woman who uses “baby talk”—high-pitched
and simplistic sentences and vocabulary—positions herself as a mother,
expressing a particular gendered, expected “stance” in relation to any audience
(349). Gender becomes, in this way, an expression of social meaning (337). Of
course, any particular gender construction is contextual. The construction of
gender through language is variable (dependent upon context) even for one
particular women.
Language is contextual, referential. Therefore, a speech act that positions
the self betrays some social information about the speaker; Ochs and others
would identify this linguistic phenomenon as indexicality (339). And while
language is not supposed to directly index gender, per se, it is indirectly related
to the development of a gendered persona that might be adopted and reinforced
by a speaker (340). In this way, commonly known linguistic markers might “recast
the past” and “precast the future,” according to Ochs (346). However, while
certain acts and markers exist which correspond to gender stereotypes, there are
instances of transformation, when a particular marker or linguistic form might be
reinterpreted over time or by various groups, lending to certain utterances a
“multifarious signalling” [sic] (Ochs 338).
Penelope Eckert discusses variation and the indexical field, wherein
certain “salient” variables might operate within a “field of potential meanings—an
indexical field, or constellation of ideologically related meanings” (454). These
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constructed linguistic meanings, paired with other elements of style such as
dress and gesture, feed into personae, and are an example of what Eckert would
call enregistered voices, which “locat(e) register in continual process of
production and reproduction” (Ochs 456). Interestingly, while Eckert asserts
these stylistic variations may be mostly “local,” meaning they reflect and work to
express local identities and ideologies, eventually they function as “linguistics
signs” that connect these local identities and ideologies to the larger “political
economy and more specifically to the demographic categories that both emerge
from and constrain local practice” (456). Basically, then, stylistic variations are
what Eckert calls “salient” elements in language that act as signposts in the
semiotic chain of signification. Eckert describes these stylistic practices as a
“bricolage [Hebdige 1984], in which individual resources (in this case, variables)
can be interpreted and combined with other resources to construct a more
complex meaningful identity” (457). Thus, stylistic moves become an indirect
means of gender indexicality. And, just as Ochs refers to a “multifarious
signalling,” Eckert argues that linguistic opposition to a certain community can be
indexed through linguistic variables. Certain variables may even be hyperarticulated—what Eckert calls “recursiveness”—to exert such an opposition
(459). Variables are further used to index “authenticity” within social context
(462). In this way, according to Eckert, variables are used to make certain
“ideological moves” in the creation of identity. Linguistic variables, then, are
reflective of stance, and thus are political statements because of their capacity to
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embrace, comment on, and refute group mentalities. As Eckert states, “meanings
associated with variables (are) based in highly salient ideological issues” (466). It
follows that gender, as a sociolinguistic construct, is a phenomenon that can be
refuted and assisted by politicized linguistic variants.
Variables are, finally, closely related to power (or the lack thereof), class
affiliation or the maintenance of or resistance to institutional alliances, and
affiliation with or opposition to social groups (Eckert 470). Because linguistic
variables may be linked to disparate social groups, they have immense power to
effect change. As Eckert so poetically terms it, “all change unfolds in the course
of day-to-day exchange, and that exchange involved local reinterpretation and
repositioning” (472). In other words, it is in the small speech events that take
place between people that linguistic change occurs.
Norma Mendoza-Denton discusses the tenuous phenomenon of identity
indexing in the positing, using “creaky voice,” of the Chicana gang persona.
Using the catch-phrase semiotic hitchhiking for intertextuality, Mendoza-Denton
identifies “creak” as a contextualization cue across contexts of usage (Eckert
would say that “creak” is a “salient” variable). Mendoza-Denton details the ways
that “creak,” used by Chicana/o gang members originally, has now been
appropriated by rappers in the mainstream, and how creak has also appeared in
video games and other media—such as the internet—as an exaggerated and
mocking racial marker (273). While “creak” itself is not a marker I will discuss in
this thesis, “creak” is a poignant example of how “effortful” (Eckert 469) choices
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are made in the positing of identity by individuals within a social group, and which
can change over time to expand and transform. Mendoza-Denton writes that
“creak,” originally used by males to indicate masculinity, first transferred to a
feminine marker of Chicana gang members trying to keep their emotions under
control, to appear “hardcore” (266). In the light of “creak’s” manifestation into a
social comment (Mendoza-Denton would say this is entextualization, a
recontextualization of a variable used in another context other than originally
intended [269]), “creak” shows how a discourse device can be recycled and
repurposed. In Mendoza-Denton’s words, “creak” is part of a “counterhegemonic
gendered performance” (270). I argue there might be other ways in which women
might entextualize gendered markers to indicate opposition to and alliance with
the social hierarchy.
“Creak” is just one salient example of linguistic entextualization that
duplicates “prior texts” while making use of double meaning and subjectivity. In
the past century, linguists such as Deborah Tannen and Robin Lakoff and French
feminists like Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray have conducted this very
conversation about “feminine” ways of communicating which favor duplicity,
complexity, and subjectivity in meaning—as opposed to the Westernized, male
way of communicating in a short, direct, unilateral manner and a “business-like”
tone. Thus, Mary Bucholtz, in her “Editor’s Introduction” to the revised and
expanded edition of Robin Lakoff’s Language and Woman’s Place, clarifies that,
for Lakoff, “ ‘woman’s language’ is not fundamentally about gender but more
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basically about the displayed lack of power” (6). Similarly, Shari Kendall argues
that women have held more “socializing roles, all of which involve the modeling
of or explicit instruction in ‘ladylike’ language” (qtd. in Bucholtz, “Introduction” 7),
reiterating the idea that “woman’s language” is implicitly taught to girls as a way
to enter into a sort of exclusive clique, and that this language is then implicitly
reinforced by its continued usage. Ochs’ example of baby talk is just one such
example: baby talk is mastered by young girls from their first words, when they
practice mothering with dolls and practice being hostesses with “tea parties.”
But third-wave feminism asks the world to develop new ways of identifying
what is feminine. It asks that we address not only the white, middle-class or elite,
Western idea of what is feminine, but to move beyond the conventional idea of
femininity toward a much more inclusive definition of what is “woman” and what
is “feminine,” to welcome women of all cultures, races, and “genders.” Kira Hall
and Bucholtz, in the “Introduction” to Gender Articulated, very succinctly cover
three major veins in philosophy regarding “woman’s language”:
The investigation of how cultural paradigms of gender relations are
perpetuated through language; the study of woman’s innovative
use of language to subvert this dominant belief system; and the
examination of how women construct social identities and
communities that are not determined in advance by gender
ideologies (9).
Bucholtz and Hall refer specifically to Mendoza-Denton’s work, which recognizes
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that “time-honored democratic institutions and practices may in fact engender
asymmetrical power relations between men and women,” but adds that women
are “able to draw upon counterstrategies that may serve as new methods of
empowerment” (11). Further, they note that Mary Talbot’s “[demonstration] that
the construction of femininity itself is a practice in which institutions and individual
women work together, often to women’s detriment” (12). Next, Bucholtz and Hall
note that “women as producers of language [might] resist or subvert hegemonic
notions of gender” and “present women as agents who may defy or embrace
gendered expectations of language behavior for their own purposes” (13).
Finally, Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet demonstrate that “because speakers
of every community invoke language ideologies together with their own local
ideologies and practices in order to establish positions of power, language
analysts must become aware of these belief systems before embarking on the
study of discursive identity” (qtd. in Bucholtz and Hall, “Introduction” 8). Of
course, the summative argument is that gender is societally constructed, and that
women do not have to accept the gender definition handed down to them.
Linguistic theory indicates that gender shows the sociolinguistic construction of
the self: women have the power to frame and reframe society’s expectation
through linguistic moves.

Revisioning an Old Saw: Finding Peace Between
Disparate Theoretical Approaches
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However, French feminists have argued that femininity might be defined
as a certain essence of plurality. Irigaray elucidates this viewpoint:
‘She’ is indefinitely other than herself. This is doubtless why she is said to
be whimsical, incomprehensible, agitated, capricious…not to mention her
language, in which ‘she’ sets off in all directions leaving ‘him’ unable to
discern the coherence of any meaning. Hers are contradictory words,
somewhat mad from the standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever
listens to them with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in
hand. For in what she says, too, at least when she dares, woman is
constantly touching herself. She steps ever so slightly aside from herself
with a murmur, an exclamation, a whisper, a sentence left
unfinished….When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. From
another point of pleasure, or of pain. One would have to listen with
another ear, as if hearing an ‘other meaning’ always in the process of
weaving itself, of embracing itself with words, but also of getting rid of
words in order not to become fixed, congealed in them. For if ‘she’ says
something, it is not, it is already no longer, identical with what she means.
What she says is never identical with anything, moreover; rather, it is
contiguous. It touches upon. And when it strays too far from that proximity,
she breaks off and starts over at ‘zero’: her body-sex (29).
I quote this passage at length because it reflects what Irigaray argues about the
“body-sex;” from this passage one can infer that women are, as Irigaray puts it,
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“plural” (28), in body and in mind. What a tall order—from this passage a woman
might develop an inferiority complex if she were not, say, bisexual and
schizophrenic. And yet, I hear in this somewhat parallel explication of the
“feminine mind” alongside body-sex, something of “multifarious signalling” and of
Mendoza-Denton’s “counterhegemonic gendered performance.” It may be that
women have become, by necessity as subjected beings, experts at subversion
and multiple voicing.
However, it may be that the issue of gender identity cannot be discussed
without reference to the actual biological difference(s) between men and women;
indeed, we know from linguistic and identity theory that we are all bound by
societal traditions and expectation. But our bodies, too, are bound in this same
way. In this vein of thought, body theory was born. Judith Butler, author of the
seminal Bodies That Matter, posits that because of the traditional Greek
philosophy that only a male can be a subject--which is divorced from the body as
it transcends materiality--the concept of an identifiable “feminine” may be
contained in the materiality of the body, having been “left behind” by societal
conception (54-55). In other words, because (1) women throughout history have
been denied education and citizenship by male society; (2) women have been
seen as the origin of sin from the time of Eve’s eating of the forbidden fruit in the
Garden of Eden; and (3) women have been tied to the work of their bodies-namely, that of producing and caring for children; women have been denied the
ability to transcend the body, conceptually and practically. If, then, the materiality
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of the body is conceived as a decidedly “feminine” phenomenon, this conception
can inform our reading of literature and society, to unearth a “feminine”
characterized by Otherness.
But herein lies the rub--if third-wave feminism agrees with French
feminism in the “plurality” of the feminine, could there not be a tenuous peace
made between the two groups--a further clarification and reworking of their two
approaches? Can these two theoretical perspectives become friends?

The Nonthematizable, Pleasurable Other
For the French feminist Irigaray, the world operates according to the
symbolic order of language, and she speaks of a “‘specular’ outside” which
represents the “nonthematizable” area outside the male conception of the (male)
speaking subject. If women operate as part and parcel of this “nonthematizable”
outside, their language, too, would be characterized as “nonthematizable.”
Cixous’ “The Laugh of the Medusa” portrays such a “feminine” that
welcomes communion with the Other—“togetherness with the Other”—which
multiplies its own existence and identity, which “transform(s) by the thousands”…
“without danger, without pain, without loss--of moments of self, of consciousness,
of persons one has been, goes beyond, leaves. It doesn’t happen without
expense--of sense, time, direction” (43). In other words, Cixous seems to say
that women transcend themselves within themselves; women transcend the
material body while occupying it. This is a novel concept; in Westernized Judeo-

13

Christian society especially, the goal of the educated man has always been to
transcend the physical bondage of the material body, to reach--or to at least
approach--divinity by communion with God. In this light, Cixous’ remarks about
the ability of woman to transcend the body while occupying the societal
conception of its materiality is a literal and a figurative statement of feminine
power, since to many women, our bodies cannot be divorced from their
functionality. Indeed, this irrevocable tie to functionality provides the impetus for
linguistic ideas of a “woman’s language.” But there is hope.
Butler suggests that “sexed” language is associated with the natural,
leaving “sex” to represent something “pre-linguistic” to which there is no
“immediate access.” Al Becker asserts that “The actual a-priori of any language
event…is an accumulation of remembered prior texts” (qtd. in Tannen 37).
Hence, style, like sex, is also thought of as “a-priori” or rooted in intertextuality
(Tannen 37), meaning that any citational practice mimics citational practices
which have come before it. Thus, gender, like style, might be termed an
“accumulation of remembered texts.” If to be a woman is “natural”, then to be a
woman is to be a versatile original, and the gendered frame of the woman is a
copy, or the specular image of the woman (Butler 43-45). In effect, the specular
woman is the “accumulation of remembered texts” to which Amos conspicuously
chooses to allude. In Pleasure of the Text, Roland Barthes writes: As “language
is redistributed…two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing
edge… and another edge, mobile, blank, (ready to assume any contours).”
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Finally, by indexing multiple versions of Irigaray’s “specular” woman--the woman
society continually frames and expects--Amos shows the versatility of the
“natural.”
Barthes describes the “erotic” as the “flaw” or “seam” between culture and
its “dismantling” (6-7). Thus, in a text analyzed as skillfully, subversively
“feminine” in style, the “edges” being created might be termed the “specular” and
the “natural.” These edges would be marked by erotic, “pleasurable” points in the
text in which there is a blur between the signifier and its signified.
What linguists and French feminists do agree on is that societal norms
influence the modes of discourse which are acceptable; there is an undisputed
idea that the dominant portion of society decides the accepted modes or mores
of conversation and interaction. According to many a linguist, the “signifier,” or
the symbol used to represent a “sign,” or physical object, is “slippery” and easily
misread. This means that the signification of any sign is negotiable, just as the
discursive practices used to signify it are negotiable. Thus, goes the theory,
language, including any signifier and the discursive practices used to identify it,
can be “co-opted” by any speaker.
Tannen, in a chapter entitled “Repetition in Conversation: Toward a
Poetics of Talk” refers to what she calls “prepatterning” in language, which is a
certain “idiomaticity” or “ubiquity of prepatterned expressions per se” (38).
Further, she argues that “it is the play between fixity [expressions which have
been “handed-down,” so to speak, over time] and novelty [new, “original” ways of
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patterning language] that makes possible the creation of meaning” (37).
Stunningly, Tannen makes no reference to Julia Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic
Language in this chapter; Kristeva’s work seems an oeuvre designed to provide
the basis for Tannen’s thesis here. But what Tannen does refer to is a bit by
Mikhail Bakhtin:
Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was
directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute,
charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist -- or, on the
contrary, by the ’light’ of a line of words that have already been spoken
about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view,
alien value judgments and accents …
The living utterance…cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living
dialogic threads…. (I)t cannot fail to become an active participant in social
dialogue. After all, the utterance of ideas arises out of this dialogue as a
continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it -- it does not approach the object
from the sidelines (qtd. in Tannen 43).
Similarly, Leon S. Roudiez, in his introduction to the English translation of
Kristeva’s Poetic Language, remarks that considering Kristeva‘s method of what
he terms “textual” rather than “literary” analysis, “(t)he text that is analyzed is
actually the effect of the dialectical interplay between semiotic and symbolic
dispositions. Here it would be helpful to keep in mind the etymology of the word
and think of it as texture, a ‘disposition or connection of threads, filaments, or
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other slender bodies, interwoven’ (Webster 2)” (Roudiez 5). Kristeva asserts that
if any text can be analyzed in this way, it means that “linguistics is opened up to
all possible categories, including philosophy, which linguistics thought it would be
able to escape” (Roudiez 23). Due to this attendance to a new kind of linguistics
which would refer not to “arbitrary” semiotics and “mathematized” semiotic
practices, Kristeva’s textual analysis might be seen as divorcing linguistics from
traditional logic, such as that of Aristotle and Plato (Roudiez 25-26).
Cixous, in “The Newly Born Woman,” speaks about the same societally
constructed “logocentrism and phallocentrism” framed by Irigaray, and she asks
“what would happen to the order of the world if the rock upon which they founded
this church should crumble?” (39). Similar to Cixous’ idea of a “crumbling “of
logocentricsm is Kristeva’s idea that a “shattering of discourse” can occur within
language. According to Kristeva, “linguistics changes constitute changes in the
status of the subject” (15). In Kristeva’s view, this “shattering” enables
participants in language to see the signifying process for what it is: a visibility
within culture. Finally, she asks to what extent this “shattering” is itself “always
already written”? Kristeva asks, “Under what conditions does (this shattering of
discourse become indispensable, censured, repressed, or marginal?… And
under what conditions does it remain a blind alley, a harmless bonus offered by a
social order which uses this ‘esoterism’ to expand, become flexible, and thrive?”
(16). The idea that second-wave feminism, thought to be so old-fashioned, can
have been on the cusp of something so modern as indexicality is stunning. Can a
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woman repurpose her body, even herself, through linguistic variables?

Barthes: Pleasure, Intertextuality, and Desire
Notably, both Kristeva and Tannen refer to the idea that the text is “always
already written.” In short, Barthes is high in the minds of both Kristeva and
Tannen. And in the end, it is Barthes’ theory of intertextuality that provides the
centrifuge for the theories I explicate here -- to show a possible place for a nonessentialist, revisionist-type of “feminine” style.
But which is it? Is linguistics a “mathematized” science moderated by
“language doctors,” such as that which Kristeva’s very doctorate would describe
her? Have we, in recognizing Kristeva’s “anti-logic” of sorts, left behind Aristotle
and Plato? Or is it, as Tannen asserts in “Repetition in Conversation: Toward a
Poetics of Talk,” that “language is less freely generated, more pre-patterned,
than most current linguistic theory acknowledges” (49)? Tannen does offer a
deceptively simple solution to this conundrum: “It is the play between fixity
[prepatterned phrases and language formulas] and novelty [new takes on old
phrases, new combinations of words or mixed formulas] that makes possible the
creation of meaning” (49). And Amos makes use of this interplay between fixity
and novelty as a jumping-off point: a pathway to “bliss.”
Barthes writes in The Pleasure of the Text about the “redistribution” of
language, in which he posits that two edges are formed: “an obedient,
conformist, plagiarizing edge…and another edge, mobile, blank (ready to
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assume any contours)” (6). This blank edge he sees as “the place where the
death of language is glimpsed” (6). “The site of a loss, the seam, the cut, the
deflation, which seizes the subject in the midst of bliss” (6). If, as Barthes asserts,
culture is an edge, blissful language rubs against this edge. In this blissful text,
as in poetry, or in Amos’ case, lyrics, “the text no longer has the sentence as its
model” (6), and the edge will be clearest in “its lexicon, its metrics, its prosody”
(6). The text will be a “powerful gush of words, a ribbon of infra-language” (6).
But Barthes explains that this more raw edge will collide with the language of
tradition, such as “(decasyllabic) meter, of assonance, of plausible neologisms, of
prosodic rhythms, of (quoted) truisms” (7). In other words, culture-language
history and usage is the other edge created by the blissful text--the “age-old
culture of the signifier” (7). If I can identify the edges created by a blissful text,
then I might glimpse the “dismantling of language” which “is intersected by
political assertion” (7). In other words, I might prove that a bliss-ful text could
change that very culture.
What is more, Barthes refers to intertextuality. In the way that Barthes
describes the function of the blissful text, he seems to say that a blissful text
makes use of the ways in which words and phrases and rhythms have been used
before. Barthes’ intertextuality is somewhat synonymous with Kristeva’s term
transposition, which, she explains, is the process of the unconscious whereby a
term, phrase, or other textual artifact is “pass(ed) from one sign system to
another” (59).
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According to Kristeva, poetic language has the potential to displace or
“breach” the thetic, or posited subject, through mimetic language (57), or
language that mimics and makes use of the symbolic order. In Kristeva’s view,
mimetic language displaces the thetic when it--through transgression of
grammatical rules--destroys not only denotation, or the representation of an
object, but also meaning itself, posited by the speaking subject (57).
These ideas are easily readable: what Kristeva refers to as the
“enunciating subject” is necessary to found and to sustain the symbolic order. If
the subject is subverted by poetic language, the symbolic order is disrupted.
Meaning “shatters” in the face of an “instinctual glossolalia” (58). In other words,
when meaning is displaced by prosody and grammar transgression, there can be
revolution in poetic language because, as Kristeva puts it, “mimesis and poetic
language…go through [the thetic’s] truth (signification, denotation) to tell the
‘truth’ about it’ (60)—when grammar and semantic rules are broken, the
(patriarchal) structure that animates language can be exposed at its root.
Interestingly, Kristeva delves into theology in her discussion of the
implications of such language revolution; “on the strength of their confrontation
with Bedeutung (denotation and signification), mimesis and poetic language
“assume the right to enter into the social debate” (61). But, she adds, the debate
is more than social; it is theological, because, she writes, mimesis and poetic
language may prevent the “theologization” of the thetic (61), acting as “protestors
against [religion’s] posturing” (61). In other words, grammar, syntax, signification-
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-all the rules of language--are not divine. Instead, these linguistic rules are
cultural mores, which can be tested and refuted; however, these rules are
thought to be of divine source -- and of divine consequence -- in any language
system, as Kristeva argues.
The moment in which the thetic is confronted by jouissance is what
Kristeva calls sacrifice, in which the symbolic order is reinforced (78). According
to Kristeva, all linguistic systems contain sacrifice, as a celebration, not of
violence, but as a celebration of “the positing of violence, the ‘boundary to the
infinite’ which, though fragile under the attack of violence, violates and calls upon
violence, thus constituting a precarious but indispensable guarantor of its
accomplishment” (79). In other words, sacrifice exists in linguistic systems to
bound the thetic—to reinforce boundaries to the always-already thematized.
Kristeva posits that sacrifice stands directly in opposition to art or poetry—or
lyrics in music, as it were—in which the symbolic order is dissolved or shot
through with its own precariousness, in which the fragility of the signification
process, or thesis, is revealed not to be divine, but instead posited and unstable.

Do Purple Bodies Matter?: Bodies By Butler
Taking into account the concept of the thetic with that of gender identity,
Butler remarks that it is easy to “[fall] into the trap of cultural determinism” while
trying to weigh the importance of the “constitutive and compelling status of
gender norms” (x), and argues that bodies only “figure”—“only appear, only
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endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered
regulatory schemas” (xi). Further, she argues that “[t]o claim that sex is already
gendered, already constructed, is not to explain in which way the ‘materiality’ of
sex is forcibly produced” (xi). Butler’s remarks here tellingly coincide with those of
Kristeva as she writes about the breach of the thetic:
The semiotic’s breach of the symbolic in so-called poetic practice
can probably be ascribed to the very unstable yet forceful positing
of the thetic. In our view, the analysis of texts shows that thetic
lability is primarily a problem with imaginary captation
(…scopophilia, the need for a mirror or an identifying addressee,
etc) and a resistance to the discovery of castration (thereby
maintaining the phallic mother who usurps the place of the Other)
(63).
Taking both of these remarks into account, one might say “sex” is an example of
the “very unstable, yet forceful positing of the thetic,” which according to Kristeva,
“gives rise to ‘fantasies’” and “attempt[s] to dissolve the first social censorship-the bar between signifier and signified“--even as it “fail[s] to prevent the
constitution of the symbolic” (63). Kristeva notes that in this event, “[l]anguage
thus tends to be drawn out of its symbolic function (sign-syntax) and is opened
out within a semiotic articulation” (63). This is the “irruption of the semiotic chora.”
When irruption takes place, signs seem to stand for new things, or they stand for
their language histories, not for the objects they were meant to signify.
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When this irruption takes place in what Kristeva calls poetic language,
there is the possibility for jouissance--poetic language “introduce[s] through the
symbolic that which works on, moved through, and threatens it” (81). In short,
grammar, syntax, and signification represent what is “thematizable” for the
culture in which a language is used; when poetic language is used, these rules
are broken, creating an erotic “seam” (to borrow from Barthes) that disrupts the
signification practices of the culture, while allowing poetic language to comment
on, revise, and refigure the signifying culture’s language. Kristeva remarks: “In
contrast to sacrifice, poetry shows us that language lends itself to the penetration
of the socio-symbolic by jouissance, and that the thetic does not necessarily
imply theological sacrifice” (80). In other words, when jouissance occurs,
grammar, syntax, and language are plainly revealed as cultural iconography
rather than divinely inspired edicts.
How do jouissance and the theologization of the thetic figure the feminine?
Wordplay, multiple meanings, and the blurring of meaning reaffirm that culture
can be reshaped, and that their shape is a cultural phenomenon. If sex, then, is a
societal construction, sex is something that can reshaped, revisioned.
Butler asks: “What are the constraints by which bodies are materialized as
‘sexed,’ and how are we to understand the ‘matter’ of sex, and of bodies more
generally, as the repeated and violent circumscription of cultural intelligibility?
Which bodies come to matter--and why?” (xii). And her answer is simply that
through language participation and through tacit acceptance of societal rules and
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mores, some of which have been handed down to us from the days of Plato and
Aristotle. Kristeva writes that “the sacred—sacrifice —which is found in every
society, is, then, a theologization of the thetic, itself structurally indispensable to
the positing of language” (78). According to Butler, the Western world’s reliance
upon the logic of these two philosophers—Plato and Aristotle—for its system of
logic and persuasion shapes our ideas of who can speak—of who is visible in our
culture. Aristotle’s idea of matter: “‘[M]atter is potentiality [dyanameos], form
actuality.’ In reproduction, women are said to contribute matter; men, the form”
(qtd. in Butler 31). Thus, as Butler explains, “insofar as matter is clearly defined
by a certain capacity to originate and to compose that for which it supplies the
principle of intelligibility, then matter is clearly defined by a certain power of
creation and rationality” (32). Butler continues: “For Aristotle the soul designates
the actualization of matter, where matter is understood as fully potential and
unactualized” (32). In other words, Butler remarks, matter “only appears under a
certain grammatical form” and its intelligibility “is indissoluble from what
constitutes its matter” (33). What Butler means here is that the form of the human
body has, in some manner, shaped the grammar and syntax used to describe it.
Next, Butler refers to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, wherein he
describes the soul as “an instrument of power through which the body is
cultivated and formed” or “a power-laden schema that produces and actualizes
the body itself” (33). In other words, without the soul invested with power, the
body is not actualized, does not figure or read as visible in our culture (34-35).
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Indeed, if we rely upon these two for our traditions for signification, the only
subject can be male. And this is a crucial point for bodies that matter, even for
people who matter—people who signify. If a body cannot be linked to a soul
invested with power, the body itself is depreciated, unimportant.

A Final Note: Feminine Identity Styling/Performance
Butler, commenting on the performativity of gender, asks: “If I [persist] in
this notion that bodies [are] constructed, perhaps I really thought that words
alone had the power to craft bodies from their own linguistic substance?” (x).
According to Kate McCarthy, “the female body is presented not only as a locus of
oppression, but as a kind of performance site, where cultural expectations about
gender are rehearsed … manipulated and resisted” (70). Similarly, then, gender
is conceived as performative, where the body as a site of performance becomes
doubly significant in meaning and power. But Butler addresses the problems with
this conception in the “Introduction” to Bodies That Matter:
…(I)f I were to argue that genders are performative, that could
mean that I thought that one woke up in the morning, perused the
closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned
that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place
at night. Such a willful and instrumental object, one who decides on
its gender, is clearly not its gender from the start and fails to realize
that its existence is already decided by gender. Certainly, such a
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theory would restore a figure of a choosing subject--humanist--at
the center of a project whose emphasis on construction seems to
be quite opposed to such a notion (x).
What Butler stipulates here is that gender cannot only be seen as performance;
that is, gender is not a choice. Gender is constructed for the speaker; it is a
collocation of meanings taken together as an identity marker—a set of
“remembered texts.” Indeed, Butler argues that the only agency a speaker can
have is to “be constituted in and by the signifier, where ‘to be constituted’ means
‘to be compelled to repeat or cite or mime’ the signifier itself” (220).

Musical Artists in General and Amos in Particular
Musical artists quintessentially comment on and break societal
expectation. Joanne Hollows discusses popular culture’s capability to “make over
the popular” (190). But Amos isn’t the only female artist making over the feminine
image. Karina Eileraas, along with Lori Burns and Melissa LeFrance, authors of
Disruptive Divas, and Sheila Whiteley, author of Women and Popular Music,
investigate the ways that popular media icons such as Fiona Apple, Courtney
Love, Pink, Gwen Stefani, and Tori Amos, along with other feminine punk, rock,
ska and other artists play with the societal idea of the female image by
“performing ugliness,” subverting the societal expectation that they exhibit girlish
“prettiness,” while breaking cultural boundaries.
Amos is distinct here, however, in that her lyrics might be said to redefine
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the terms on which we base what “feminine” means, and it is through her lyrics,
more than through the lyrics of other artists, that I see correspondence between
this a priori gut-feeling I have about her work, and the linguistic and feminist
theories I use here to analyze her lyrics. Moreover, historically speaking, I argue
that women have become masters at manipulating a dualistic “edge” through
their linguistic and “feminine” discursive practices, and that Amos’ lyrics are a
signpost for these discursive practices. (Maybe that is why so many women
connect with the lyrics of Amos.) Finally, if Amos, as a woman and as a
performer, is using the “phallocentric” language of dominant discourse, she may
decide to mix it up. But given also that Amos figures “outside” the land of male
specular-ity, she herself is as slippery as, say, the famous “woman behind the
wallpaper” in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s famous work “The Yellow Wallpaper.” In
fact, her status as a performer makes her linguistic decisions all the more
poignant, effective, and overall, more damaging to logocentrism.
It is this “crumbling” alluded to by Cixous—the bringing down of
logocentrism, which Amos’ lyrics accomplish through their subversion of words
and their meaning within Amos’ sphere. Amos works with words to blur, mute,
and revise their meanings. This muddying corresponds to Cixous’ definition of
writing for women: “Writing is woman’s…woman admits there is an
other….Writing is the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the dwelling place of
the other in me.” Writing “gives neither rest nor security, always disturbs the
relationship to ‘reality,’ produces an uncertainty that gets in the way of the
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subject’s socialization” (42). Thus, the lyrics of Amos disrupt notions of femininity,
and, with “other-ness”—these lyrics do the work of de-socialization.
Taken together, Amos’ oeuvre represents three stages in the feminine
body’s actualization. First, there is girlhood and shyness, and self-hatred incited
by the inevitable wounds inflicted upon her for the reason of her femininity. Here,
the wounding results in shame. Here, too, a girl develops her “breadcrumbs,” her
only means of signification while maintaining her feminine place. In the second
stage, the woman begins to manufacture signs who she is
beneath/behind/through the specular image placed on her. This stage is
characterized by sexual experimentation, rage and raving as she begins to
realize her “bounded”-ness. In the third and final stage, the woman becomes an
actualized body, independent of the need for a phallus. She successfully wields
poetic language to achieve jouissance. She develops any one of several paths to
this independence, in which she breaks through/beyond the specular image. In
this stage, either/or thinking is replaced by both/and/all-together logic and in
which old schematic and thematic ruts are eradicated in favor of a “new,”
inclusive and actualized “feminine” style. I am using “Mother” and “Girl,” and
“Cloud On My Tongue” to explicate the first stage in the development;
“Professional Widow” and “Code Red” to explicate the second stage; and “Velvet
Revolution,” “Body and Soul,” and “Dragon” to explicate the third and final stage.

Case In Point
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According to Irigaray, the “body”--the “feminine” body--is “the site of
inscription that cannot be explicitly thematized” (qtd. in Butler 38). Thus, as Butler
states, the feminine is…nonthematizable materiality” (42). In Amos’ “Purple
People” the speaker reflects, “just when you escape/ you have yourself to fear;”
to find or define oneself as a woman is to tolerate an inaccurate specular identity-a specular definition, denoted by a signifier/signified blur--and yet, to place
oneself outside the male system of representation is to have no signification
whatsoever. Thus, when the speaker asks, “Do you do judo when they surround
you,” she implies the split of the body from masculine historicity--the “lily-white
matricide of vicious words.” The “natural” body, exiled from the specular woman,
is banished from matter, and thus, from meaning (Butler 32).
I watch me be this other thing, i never know
if I’m marooned or where the purple people go
then lily white matricide from vicious words
it doesn’t leave a scratch so therefore no one’s hurt.
Next, the speaker muses, “I watch me be this other thing and I never know/ if I’m
marooned or where the purple people go.” Here, “the lily-white matricide of
vicious words” is slippery, because according to Irigaray’s theory of iteration,
when a woman utters herself, she iterates phallogocentric speech that erases her
even as she is expressed. In addition, because the mother signifies as less than
a person, “it doesn’t leave a scratch so therefore, no one’s hurt.”
The speaker in “Purple People” asks whether the specular “thunder,” a
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sound that “wishes it could be the snow,” or physical sign, can be expelled by the
woman through “a little mental yoga,” enabling her to enjoy the natural “gifts” of
the actualized body that exist “for her, for you, for me.” This realization of the
actualized body found in Amos’ lyrics--the “explicitly nonthematiz(able)” body, the
site of immateriality--is boldly indexed through linguistic identity styling, which
ultimately reads as a poignant example of a salient, various “feminine” body
come to matter.
In my next chapter, I will elucidate how theories of gender, femininity, and
the “feminine” body come-to-matter come to fruition in certain sites in Amos’
oeuvre. I will prove through detailed analysis that not only do Amos lyrics perform
gender, but they also achieve “bliss” a lá Barthes, through which irruption of the
semiotic chora, and thus, the feminine body come to matter, are discernible.
Might a feminine body come-to-matter—signifying as an original and not as a
part or as a copy—implicate strict revisions to our logical systems? How can we
reconceive the “feminine” and what it means in our culture to be perceived as
“feminine”?
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CHAPTER TWO
EXPLICATION

Stage One--Mother, Shame, and the Wound
The French feminist idea of a “feminine” language—language that would
defy “patrilinear” rules of language use (Kristeva)—implies social and linguistic
language change. Amos’ lyrics provide a very specific example of such language
change as Kristeva suggests, and while she indexes various female personae in
her work, she does not favor an essentialist definition of what it is to be
‘feminine.” Rather, she accomplishes a certain “double voicing” similar to that
mentioned by Bucholtz (“You Da Man” 450), wherein the “hegemonic
masculine”—and the hegemonic feminine, for that matter—is referenced, called
to task, and refuted. Sociolinguistic theorists such as Bucholtz, Kira Hall, and Ben
Rampton have teased out the relationship between gender and hegemony,
arguing that gender identity “occupies a hegemonic position in a given pattern of
gender relations “ of which “only a certain subset are acceptable” (“You Da Man,”
Bucholtz 444). While no gender identity is “monolithic,” certain gender identities,
in particular contexts, are figured as “feminine,” while others are not.
Further, Eckert, Ochs, and Mendoza-Denton have discussed how certain
“salient variables” may be used to make stylistic moves, to create and revision
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identity, to position the self as “authentic” within one group while positioning the
self against another group. Through the process of entextualization, which relies
on Barthes’ theories of intertextuality, Eckert argues that variables can be used to
transform one’s identity, and that these same variables might transform in their
meaning over time. As Eckert asserts, “Participation in discourse involves a
continual interpretation of forms in context, an in-the-moment assigning of
indexical values to linguistic forms” (463), and even “(a) word’s denotation can
absorb connotations through associations with aspects of the context in which it
was used and most certainly, stances” (464). While Kristeva notes in her
discussion of jouissance that the signifier is shown to be unstable—it signifies
“multiply” or in ways that are “blurred” when used purposefully to expose the
hidden prejudices inherent in the signification process—Eckert sees the signifier
as changeable, as an unstable sign within the unstable, yet fixed (by repeated
citation) sign-chain of signification. Thus, one might say that signification is an
interplay of fixed and unfixed forces—a mixture of language devices used
purposefully, which stabilizes and destabilizes the sign-chain itself. I argue that it
is in just this way that a “feminine” style, especially in artistic works, might be
identified; a persona is indexed through alliances with and against certain social
groups, in which one makes use of an implicit understanding of salient variables,
semiotic hitchhikers. Moreover, though this use of semiotic hitchhikers, language
change at the level of signification can occur; new/unstable identities indexed
and formed; and language tradition contested, even as it is being cited.
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In this chapter, I will flesh out the three stages of development toward an
actualization of the “feminine” represented in Amos’ work, as I see it. Using
Butler’s body theory, French feminist theory—especially that of Kristeva and
Irigaray, and the theories of intertextuality (i.e., language threads) as discussed
by Barthes and Tannen, I will clarify several poignant moments in Amos’ work
that exemplify moments of “feminine” style. Precisely at these moments, too, are
moments of semiotic “hitchhiking” and identity indexing such as Mendoza-Denton
and Eckert describe. Thus, the moments of intertextuality become moments of
the sort of jouissance that Kristeva would term “revolution in poetic language,” or
an activist brand of “feminine” style.

“Mother” and Barthes
Susan Bordo notes in her “Introduction” to Unbearable Weight that the
“continuing power and pervasiveness of certain cultural images” have led women
to “internalize (an) ideology” of guilt, which “festers into unease with our
femaleness, shame over our bodies, and self-loathing” (8). It is this “ideology of
guilt” which characterizes the first stage of a woman’s development; she learns
how the world works, and she learns her own (subjective) place in it. Specifically,
women are shamed, even as they have been allowed signification—as Kristeva
or Butler might say—only as an “outside,” divorced from mattering. Just as in
“Purple People,“ in which the feminine body is promised its materiality, Amos’
“Mother” presents a similar image—the mother as a the body or the chora, as
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Butler terms it (41)—but also as a site of pleasure (Barthes 6).
Go, go, go, go now
Out of the nest it’s time
Go, go, go go now
Circus girl
Without a safety net
Here here here here now
Don’t cry
You raised your hand for the assignment
Tuck those ribbons under
Your helmet
Be a good soldier
First my left foot
Then my right behind the other
Pantyhose running in the cold
Here, the mother has been equalized with the chora (that image which is only
fixed [by language] in the mind and cannot change, and cannot signify). Although
the mother as the chora represents the constant who will remain after being
entered and left (Butler 41) –who will “leave the light on”—presumably, for the
daughter, the speaker, leaving to “dance with him”—and who begins by telling
her daughter to “go out of the nest/it’s time,” she still instructs her daughter to
“tuck those ribbons under (her) helmet/be a good soldier.” This pleasurable edge
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could signify in several different ways: the speaker may be asking the girl to “tuck
her ribbons under” to avoid being seen as a girl; or, rather, it may be that she is
to simply remain strong as she goes into the battlefield, a place reserved
traditionally for men. This “Mother” may herself be a “plagiarizing” and
“conforming” edge, or is she an edge “ready to assume any contours” (Barthes
6)? Of course, the mother may be simply advising her daughter to be strong in
the face of offenses against her femininity, or this mother may simply hope her
daughter will participate in society by properly “lik(ing) the dancing”, and by
marrying and having children, as a “good girl” should do. In short, the “girl” in this
song may conform, or she may adopt a male persona—further, she may decide
on something in between, a gender-identification of her own construction.
“Go, go, go, go now/out of the nest/ it’s time,” urges the mother. What time
signifies in this first verse? It may be time to breach the thetic, or is it “time” for
the girl to become a woman by participating in her own destruction/erasure? The
helmet may be “just a helmet,” as Freud might say -- or it may be a phallus. This
may be a way in which the feminine “transgresses” or is “excessive” (Irigaray 2833). This girl may misbehave, or she may simply learn how to be in her
(woman’s) body—to make it conform to expectation—in this (man’s) world.
The guilt-ridden ideology referred to by Bordo is apparent most readily in
Amos’ second verse:
I walked into your dream
And now I've forgotten how to dream my own dream
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You are the clever one aren't you
Brides in veils for you
We told you all of our secrets
All but one
So don't you even try
The phone has been disconnected
Dripping with blood
And with time
And with your advice
Poison me against the moon
In other words, women have been taught to view their own bodies with shame:
as young girls, women learn to be embarrassed by their parts and bodily
functions—the menstrual cycle—because their bodies have always been the
reason for their subjection. Further, because young women have been taught to
internalize a male fear or hatred for the female form/body/functionality, the
speaker muses: “I walked into your dream/and now I’ve forgotten how to dream/
my own dream,” she refers to hegemonic practices, e.g. marriage—“brides in
veils,” “he’s gonna change my name”—which have shaped her idea of herself as
a “successful” woman (mother and wife) that represents the societal ideal.
Kristeva writes about the idea of “sacrifice,” in which a symbolic replacement of
violence for a specific violent act of murder reinforces the symbolic order. In
some way, the “girl” at the center of the narrative in Amos’ “Girl” represents the
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sacrifice women must make to reinforce the symbolic order of society—father,
mother, child—or the posited thetic, bounded and reproduced by the chora (7281).
Further, the speaker accuses, “we told you all of our secrets/all but one/so
don’t you even try.” I argue that the secret to which she refers is that of how
women create life. But instead “The phone has been disconnected/dripping with
blood/ and with time and with your advice/poison me against the moon” because
women are “poisoned” against themselves by hegemonic practices, which fault
them for their bodies because of their functionality, their capability of producing
life.
The functionality of the female body is what has classically linked it to its
status as specular--as what Irigaray terms as “outside” the scope of male
representation. If to be male is to be, for example, made in the image of God,
then to be a woman is to be something else, something “outside” or, as Kristeva
proposes, “nonthematizable” (qtd. in Butler 42).
In the coda, the speaker muses:
I escape into your escape
into our very favorite fearscape
it’s across the sky and I cross my heart
and I cross my legs
oh my God.
Here the speaker refers not only to the specular “outside” but also to its lack of
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signification, or possibly to the “woman’s world” as represented by Mary
Wollstonecraft, wherein “from their infancy (women are taught) that beauty is
woman’s scepter, the mind shapes itself to the body, and running around its gilt
cage, only seeks to adorn its prison” (qtd. in Bordo 18), resulting in what Pat
Manairdi might term the senseless and irrelevant “‘micropractices’ of everyday
life” for women (qtd. in Bordo 18), such as “breadcrumbs lost under the snow.”
These micropractices Amos refers to result in what Irigaray’s catachresis,
or “an improper transfer of sense” (qtd. in Butler 37) because as Lakoff notes:
…a girl is damned if she does, damned if she doesn’t. If she
refuses to talk like a lady, she is ridiculed and subjected to criticism
as unfeminine; is she does learn, she is ridiculed as unable to think
clearly, unable to take part in a serious discussion: in some sense,
as less than fully human. These two choices which a woman has-to be less than a woman or less than a human--are highly painful
(Language and Woman’s Place 41).
In other words, an “improper transfer of sense happens” when what is purported
to be “woman’s language,” or sometimes what is a women’s activity, such as
leaving breadcrumbs on the ground for the birds, becomes covered with the
specular—in this case, the snow. In this way, women’s language and women’s
identity markers--these “micro practices” referred to so poignantly by
Wollstonecraft--become symbolic of repression and become “co-opted”
(Bucholtz), using language that Barthes would say is pleasurable for both its
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“plagiari(sm)” and its “unbounded…contours” (6).
Amos’ speaker indexes the specular and its outside as she describes a
girl who seems lost in the shadows. But what are the shadows, exactly?
from in the shadow she calls
and in the shadow she
finds a way finds a way
and in the shadow she crawls
clutching her faded photograph
my image under her thumb
yes with a message for my heart
yes with a message for my heart
The woman crawling “in the shadows” is separated from historicity by the male
specular ideal, but still “clutching her faded photograph,” which, ironically, the
speaker of the song says is her very own image. The crawling woman may speak
for all women who long to find feminine expression. The photograph might be the
feminine body, come to matter. The speaker here seems here to speak for all
women, and yet for no one in particular.
The speaker promises a redemption of sorts: “She’s been everybody
else’s girl/maybe one day she’ll be her own.” In other words, one day soon,
specular femininity may be invested with materiality, may become visible in our
culture. Ironically, this materiality seems to come to fruition through the poetic
language of these very lyrics.
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The next verse in the song is a salient example of the “instinctual
glossolalia” Kristeva refers to as poetic language.
And in the doorway they stay
and laugh as violins fill with water
screams from the bluebells
can’t make them go away
well I’m not seventeen
but I’ve cuts on my knees
falling down as the winter
takes one more cherry tree
In this verse, the young woman realizes that she is effectively on a stage, to wit,
the specular stage—where she is being closely watched by phallogocentric
society for signs of womanhood. She is painfully aware that she is being labeled
as a woman, and the cuts on her knees are already a sign of the actual process
of being taken for a woman. Specifically, “as the winter takes one more cherry
tree” might refer to her virginity being taken from her as she is bent over--thusly,
the cuts on her knees. In a sense, the verse serves to speak of the collateral
damages1 of being identified and labeled as a woman in phallogocentric society,
which begin at a very young age, “not seventeen.” Reading this verse in the
context of collateral damages, one might say the “screams from the bluebells”--a

1

These damages may be assumed to be an inferiority or misogyny complex, low self-esteem, self-loathing,
and, of course, rape.
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woman’s attempts to break the bounds of language or of her signification as
female--are not only regarded as craziness, but they are regarded as
nonsensical; ergo, the lyrics of Tori Amos. Indeed, the phrases used here—
“screams from the bluebells,” “violins fill with water,” and “takes one more cherry
tree”—are performing what Kristeva and Barthes would refer to as “plagiarism”
and “blank[ness].” While their signification is by no means certain, their
intertextuality causes them to signify in new ways, creating a jouissance in which
the message of feminine historicity is boldly visible, even if ambiguous or
“unbounded.”
Linguistically, the intertextuality of a phrase such as “on my knees” or an
object such as a cherry tree are what Mendoza-Denton might term “semiotic
hitchhikers”—images and well-known markers indicating sexual acts performed
by or on women. But these two pieces of language are “salient variables” used
by Amos, I would argue, to make a comment. Instead of derision toward a
woman performing a specific sexual act (such as the derision felt by a group of
men talking about these acts being performed), the listener feels a vague
disgust, as if truly “seeing” these things for the first time. What is more, any
frequent listener to Amos can feel a certain subversive mockery of gendered
stereotypes in her work. Just as Mendoza-Denton notes that “creak” has become
part of a stereotypical—to the point of mockery—characteristic of chola behavior
indicating prejudice (“Creaky Voice” 272), so “on my knees” and the image of the
cherry tree have become derisive elements in a very female—thus, very
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“feminine”—sexual historicity, in a Western, Judeo-Christian society prejudiced
against femaleness.
The last verse of the song completes the image of the girl as she comes to
full realization of her staid place in society. Here, she comes to terms with her
lack of signification:
And in the mist there she rides
and castles are burning in my heart
and as I twist I hold tight
and I ride to work
every morning wondering why
‘sit in the chair and be good now’
and become all that they told you
the white coats enter her room2
and I’m callin’ my baby
callin’ my baby callin’ my baby callin’
“Castles,” though they may be nice for fairy tales, do not exist in the real world. At
this stage, the “speaker-girl” is disillusioned by what she has been told her life will
mean. Rather, she realizes her life is bound by constraints of her gender and her
body. She cannot, at this point, break out of her place, though she has ceased to
believe the story she has been told about herself and her identity as a woman.
2

While it is easily perceived that the “white coats” are psychiatrists, who are remembered historically for
offhandedly classifying women as insane, I am interested in focusing on the more theoretical rather than the
pat readings of Tori Amos’ oeuvre.
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What she has been told, she realizes, is the fairy tale. Thus, the “burning” of the
castles.
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich remarked that “seldom do well-behaved women
make history.” And the speaker has been told to behave, which she apparently
has not done, by the end of the verse. But her behavior leaves her flat; she finds
no meaning in it, and she finds herself misrepresented when she is represented
at all--“and I ride to work every morning/wondering why.” Moreover, the speaker’s
“wondering why” can be taken as a lack of sense, or an improper transfer of
sense--the very catachresis which is referenced earlier in the song by the
“breadcrumbs lost under the snow.” For example, the reader seems not meant to
understand the signification of the speaker’s wondering why she is going to work.
She wonders why she has been asked to be a good girl, or why she has
complied with the request to behave. Or, finally, she wonders why her thoughts,
as woman’s language, are trivialized even as they are expressed. Possibly she
simply has no acceptable mode to correctly and accurately express herself in a
phallogocentric society which brands every word that comes out of her mouth as
a “sign” of her femininity, and thus, her inferiority. Certainly, the micropractices
mentioned in the coda—“sit in the chair and be good,” “ride to work,” and
“become all they told you”—figure as new, even meaning-less phrases, even
given their intertextuality in the context of the Women’s Rights movement and its
call to women “to have it all,” to divorce themselves from the material work of
their bodies and to figure in the workforce.
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“Cloud on My Tongue,” too, offers the perspective of a girl growing into a
woman, with the promise that she will find the signification she seeks. In same
way that “Girl” raises questions of the meaning in micropractices, “Cloud on My
Tongue” also refigures meaningful “feminine” activities:
someone’s knockin on my kitchen door
leave the wood outside, what
all the girls here are freezing cold
leave me with your borneo
i don’t need much to keep me warm
Here, the speaker asks that she is remembered as the specular when she tells
the listener to “leave me with your borneo,” to remember her as he would like to
remember her—as a girl in the kitchen, delegating the task of bringing in wood
for the fire. This verse also acts as a stance—the speaker identifies herself as a
woman acting in a traditional role by locating herself in the kitchen. As Eckert
notes, “we construct a social landscape through the segmentation of the social
terrain, and we construct a linguistic landscape through a segmentation of the
linguistic practices in that terrain” (455). By indexing the kitchen, the speaker
segments the social terrain; once she has done this important work to create the
persona, she can make certain stylistic moves to comment on the terrain.
Next, the speaker refers to the “horror” of the sex that “is not one”
(Irigaray). Here, there is a cunning interplay of double meaning, in which the
“ugly one” can read as the female genitalia--the sex which is characterized by
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“lack”--or as the girl in transition to womanhood; the proverbial “ugly duckling” to
the swan.
don’t stop now what you’re doing
what you’re doing my ugly one
bring them all here
hard to hide a hundred girls in your hair
it won’t be fair if i hate her
if i ate her
you can go now
Having positioned herself in the kitchen, the speaker can speak for herself and
other women, too, who are trying to come to terms with their sexuality or with
their transition into womanhood. Here, the speaker is already changing—
“already in there”—meaning she retains the capability to become her own
person, to signify as a person and as an actualized feminine body.
The middle and end of the verse furthers the Irigarayan symbolism of the
“horror” of “lack” (“This Sex Which Is Not One,” 23). For example, the hair hiding
a hundred girls might even refer to the pubic hair; the hatred of the girl— “it won’t
be fair if I hate her/if I ate her”—to a self-hatred of the specular outside, the girl
she is becoming, whose body is not sanctioned, or “nonthematizable.” Of course,
this couplet also refers to the horror of lack, a fear of being “swallowed up” by the
enveloping female sex organ. According to Irigaray: “(A woman’s) desire is often
interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will swallow

45

you whole” (“This Sex Which is Not One,” 29). Finally, the Irigarayan idea of
autoeroticism is implied with the line “you can go now.” The girl realizes that she
is, in fact, capable of stimulating herself by herself. She has two lips which “touch
each other all the time” (Irigaray 26).
Furthermore, the semiotic hitchhiker yet again appears, in the mention of
“in your hair.” Having positioned herself in the kitchen, the speaker can use “hair”
as a salient variable to comment on her own social position and to display
opposition to other social groups. Plainly, “hair” is a double referent to the long
hair of a woman, capable of hiding things, but also, of course, to pubic hair,
associated by proximity to the vagina. This image of hair is made even more
crucial when one considers that, throughout anthropological history, much ado
has been made about the significance of hair. Hair has been made to signify evil,
and the absence of hair has been made to signify cleanliness, innocence,
virginity. But the use Amos makes of hair in this verse is playful—mocking,
even—of conventional, historistic attitudes against hair, quipping that “it wouldn’t
be fair…if I ate her.” In other words, she plays against the fear of the “evil” hair,
and uses it only to redouble a threat, as a metaphorical feint, and I argue, asking
other women to laugh along with her. This is indexicality in Amos’ lyrics; she uses
semiotic hitchhikers like “hair” to skillfully index a “feminine” identity, making
stylistic moves to comment and refute traditional ideas about femininity itself.
In essence, then, “Cloud on My Tongue” is about the ugliness of the
transition of the sexual development, and by metaphor, the signification or
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actualization of a girl. It’s a fearsome, loathsome process. And yet, the speaker
promises that the girl is destined to make the leap: “you’re already in there/I’ll be
wearing your tattoo.” Therefore, despite the spinning in “circles and circles and
circles again” as she attempts to gain her actualized body, she can be patient
with the “ugliness” of the transition, until she finally makes it “over the bridge.”

Stage Two: Sexual Rage and Irruption of the Chora
Once a woman experiences shame and wounding at the hands of men,
there is the inevitable rage, alongside a realization that she is viewed as
property, more or less, according to the time, place, and cultural practices to
which she finds herself subjected. This is stage two of the process of becoming
an actualized woman. Here is a signification fraught with irony; she is capable of
things a man cannot do, and yet, she is treated as chattel. She is enraged, and in
a manner of speaking, she becomes insane.
Irigaray writes in “Women on the Market:”
The society we know, our own culture, is based upon the exchange
of women. Without the exchange of women, we are told, we would
fall back into the anarchy (?) of the natural world, the randomness
(?) of the animal kingdom. The passage into the social order, the
symbolic order, into order as such, is assured by the fact that men,
or groups of men, circulate women among themselves, according
to a rule known as the incest taboo (170).
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In “Professional Widow,” the speaker refers blatantly to the cycle of the incest
taboo; the speaker confronts the phallic fear of the female sexual organ on one
hand, simultaneously criticizing the idea that to have a big(ger) phallus is to be
more of a man.
slag pit
stag shit
honey bring it close to my lips
yes
don’t blow those brains yet
we gotta be big boy
we gotta be big
Here, not only does the speaker imply that the hearer may be fearful of labia, but
also, she implies that she is, in reality, only massaging the male ego with her
mocking admiration of the phallus. This is a direct female appropriation of the
phallic (Kristeva), and also a linguistic move which serves as what Eckert would
term a gendered marker, repurposed to indicate an opposition to the social
hierarchy (459) that values the phallus. Further, the speaker here criticizes
marriage practices:
starfucker just like my daddy
just like my daddy selling his baby
just like my daddy
gonna strike a deal make him feel like a congressman
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it runs in the family
The speaker likens marriage to a prostitution3 of sorts; later she concludes the
song with “she will supply.” In other words, the woman will supply her husband
with sexual pleasure on demand.
it runs in the family
mother mary
china white
brown may be sweeter
she will supply
mother mary
china white
brown may be sweeter
she will supply
She seems to ask: Where are our principles, allowing this lawful sex trade to
exist in civilized society? In short, marriage has been a “landslide of principle,”
wherein everyone participates—“everywhere a Judas as far as you can see.”
In this coda we see also the irruption of the chora, wherein signs come to
mean things they were not meant to signify. For example, “mother mary” seems
here to mean something profane rather than sacred, and as “mother mary” is
3

The speaker also refers to the religious symbolism associated with marriage, in which the bride is to be
chaste virgin; however, a man may enter the marriage contract with sexual tastes and preferences: “mother
mary/china white/brown may be sweeter.” Possibly in 1950’s American society more than any other in the
world, a woman was, of course, expected to embody a “beautiful angel” with a persona all “peaches and
cream,” urging her tired husband to “rest your shoulders” after a long day at work. Naturally, she might
cater to his interests, proudly proclaiming “‘we got every re-run of Mohammed Ali.’”
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juxtaposed with “china white” and “brown may be sweeter,” it seems to refer to
skin, or to the sex organ itself. Whatever the interpretation, the impact is the
same: women are available for men to choose--china white or brown, and
innocent as “mother mary.” Thus, all three are highly sexualized, and what is
theological by cultural standard—“mother mary”—is made to be an ordinary
woman who is prostituted, cheapened.
This irruption of the chora which occurs here also figures as
entextualization according to Mendoza-Denton (269-270); the image of mother
Mary is a salient variable—it is salient culturally and religiously in the Western
hemisphere—and here, it re-figures as an image of prostitution. Through
intertextuality, this salient variable is reinterpreted. As Eckert explains, through a
process of bricolage, “individual resources…can be interpreted and combined
with other resources to construct a more complex meaningful entity” (457). In the
case of the mother Mary variable, widely used in our society to indicate the
religio-social entity of the virgin/bitch stereotype (e.g., obsession with the candy
skull and Virgin de Guadalupe, pinups and geisha), takes on a new meaning.
Mother Mary in the context of this song is used to lay bare the moral depravity
behind the social practice of marriage, and even society’s treatment of women in
general. The image of mother Mary as a supplier of sex is a grotesque caricature
of the treatment of women, and in this light, it is much like that of “creak” when it
is used to index a chola/o identity in the larger media. As Mendoza-Denton notes,
“creak” takes on a certain racist connotation when used in the “how-to” manuals
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she describes. “Professional Widow” is, indeed, strikingly similar in tone, if one
considers it a sarcastic “how-to” manual for women.
In “Code Red,” the speaker comments on the illusive sexual agency of the
feminine. Here, the speaker “Slip(s) and slide(s) (her) way through this charade”
of being--or of feigning to be--the specular woman that society demands. But the
speaker feels a certain victory over her slippery signification, as, she quips, “I
know all the players and I must say/ Do this long enough/ you get a taste for it.”
Ironically, though she is bitter about her plight as a woman in a man’s world, the
speaker here does feel at ease in her finessing role: “Some say that I will and
some say I won’t/ Victory is an elusive whore/ She is as easily mine/ as she is
yours.” In other words, she seems to say: “Be careful--I might be getting good at
this.”
Ultimately, however, the speaker in this song knows she needs to get out
or to break out of her oppression, as evidenced in the chorus: “I’ll do this last one
and I’ll grow me some wine/ Leave them troubled boys all behind/ What you
stole, I would have given freely/ Code Red you’re staring Code Red staring at
me.” She is determined and she is biding her time until she can leave; she knows
she must leave before she dies/is suffocated/killed. She has had her fill of being
the “sheath” and of being without agency, without will: “Well sometimes he do
and sometimes he don’t/ Sometimes I love myself best alone/ Do this long
enough/ you get a taste for it.” As Irigaray argues in “This Sex Which Is Not One”:
Woman, in this sexual imaginary, is only a more or less obliging
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prop for the enactment of man’s fantasies. That she may find
pleasure there in that role, by proxy, is possible, even certain. But
such pleasure is above all a masochistic prostitution of her body to
a desire that is not her own, and it leaves her in a familiar state of
dependency upon man. Not knowing what she wants, ready for
anything, even asking for more, so long as he will “take” her as his
“object” when he seeks his own pleasure. Thus she will not say
what she herself wants; moreover, she does not know, or no longer
knows, what she wants (25).
In this passive state, the speaker of the song languishes close to despair, musing
“being trusted and lusted/ it could be worse than that.” The speaker here has
accepted a somewhat liminal signification; she is integral to the life of her man,
but she is completely resigned to never being seen as herself. She simply
threatens to disappear—to fall off the map—but she notably does not voice this
plan to her husband. She lives her life as a “second-class citizen.” She signifies
only halfway because her job is simply to be content with her life as it is;
stunningly, this sort of half-life is still experienced by women who consider
themselves “modern women” in today’s society.
Thus, the fate of the woman in the second stage is to always already be at
the beck and call of her male counterpart, and to secretly yearn for a life outside
the bounds of her liminal life. She is living in a stagnant state. She may even
have all the modern conveniences, like the woman of the fifties who got bored
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with her life of martinis at five o’clock and a roast for dinner, reading The
Feminine Mystique only to find what she knew instinctively—that her life of
washing machines and perfectly-placed vinyl furniture was a newly-fangled
prison.
Susan Faludi’s Backlash speaks in a timely manner on this struggle: are
women to feel they “have it all” when they choose to work outside the home, or
are they to feel they have abandoned their original calling as wives and mothers?
Are we more accepting of women of all body types now than we were in the
50’s? Do we regard gay and straight women as equally feminine? Or, would it be
that to be a “real” woman is to leave “femininity,” as a construct, behind?
Ironically, the past fifty years have not made this question simpler to answer. The
conventional wisdom of the current age seems to be simply that there is no
conventional wisdom. What is the answer to being fulfilled as a woman? There is
no one choice that yields a satisfying result for the women of our age.

Stage Three: Change/Jouissance
And yet, there seem to be some moments of actualization. We all know
women who are happy, who have achieved balance. Might there be, however, a
better chance for more women to feel as if the choices we have made are
acceptable? I argue here that the necessary ingredient to a healthy definition of
“femininity” is to make a certain theoretical leap. By accepting the theories of
Butler in conjunction with Kristeva and other linguistic theorists, we might arrive
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at a certain jouissance, shall we say, which may allow for our linguistic theories,
backed by the “‘age-old’ culture of the signifier” (Barthes 6) and all it implies, to
be challenged and even changed.
“Velvet Revolution” provides a view of a sexual revolution in which the
body of the woman becomes actualized. First, the speaker makes reference to
history and social position, through the metaphor of fabric: “Feeling radical in
Cotton/ Purified in my Satin/ But the bomb of the season/ is a Velvet Revolution.”
The cotton is the radical movement, possibly the women’s movement and also
associated with religious fanaticism. Next, she refers to satin, which the fabric of
evening gowns and wedding dresses. And finally, she says, it’s time to break out
the velvet--clearly the fabric of the harlot. Or, in this case, the plush fabric with all
the richness of the female sex organ. Tellingly, she says the “bomb,” which may
be read as the “balm” of the season, is velvet. In other words, it’s the answer.
Even as “prophets (cry),” the speaker says she looks to the “true Divine Creator”
for assistance.
I look at the sky
and feel the tears of the
Prophets crying
I look at the sky
and feel the rain
the rain of tears

(Amos, “Velvet Revolution”)

The speaker here is answered by the “rain”—or is it the “reign”?—of tears. I
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argue that the speaker refers here to the reign of man over woman, the reign of
phallogocentrism and the fear of women. Besides, she asserts, men have not
done such a wonderful job at ruling the planet; in other words, maybe it’s time to
give the women a shot at it.: “All you killers of the children/ there’s a new
Commandment/ the true Divine Creator wants a/ Velvet Revolution.”4 Who is this
“true” Divine Creator? I argue that Amos actually refers to a new way of figuring
the Judeo-Christian God. She asserts that the “true” God has not sanctioned the
actions taken by men in their possession or exchange of women.
In “Body and Soul,” the speaker invites the listener, or the audience, to
commune with her, to “come and live with (her)/ body and soul.” This “sweet
communion,” although it may read simply as a sexual invitation, is made spiritual
and metaphysical, even rhetorical, as she urges “lay your law down on me love.”
In other words, Aristotelian logic may not hold here, the chora may be disrupted
and cause a “fissure” of phallogocentric logic, but it may instead be that the law
must seek another (more feminine, not male) body upon which to base itself.
Thusly, she asks the male hierarchy to literally lay its law down on her, the chora,
which may cause an irruption. The reference is made again to Judeo-Christian
religion: “Seven devils bring them on/ I have left my weapons/ Cause I think
you’re wrong/ These devils of yours they need love” (Amos, “Body and Soul”). In
other words, sin, which, according to the Bible, originated with women because
of Eve’s indiscretion with the snake in the Garden of Eden, must be reevaluated
4

Would this Divine Creator be a female? A mixture of both female and male?
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because women are no more evil than men, who have sinned against women
throughout history. These lyrics are, I argue, an almost literal plea for the
irruption for which the speaker refers. If the irruption she speaks of were to occur,
the “devils” she refers to might be reevaluated in terms of their capacity for good,
simply because women, who have been blamed for original sin, might not be as
evil as Judeo-Christian religion portrays.
Finally, in “Dragon,” Amos’ speaker charges that it is a lie that this same
sin--original sin--began with women: “Don’t tell me/ A woman did this to you/
Candy lies/ Candy lies/ Candy lies.” The speaker here argues against the
traditional either/or thinking of Aristotle and of the Bible: “You touched my hand/ I
felt a force/ You called it dark/ but now I’m not so sure/ Just stay awhile…” She
argues that the forces of darkness identified by Judeo-Christian religion may not,
indeed, be evil. Next, the speaker uses the imagery of fairy tales to solidify the
notion that our belief-system and our logic needs to be broken, by referring to the
dragon as not an evil thing that “needs slaying,” but instead a beast to whom she
will bring kisses. Thus, just as in “Body and Soul,” “Dragon” refutes either/or
thinking for the perspective of both/and inclusiveness.
Clearly the speaker places Judeo-Christian religion at the heart of the
oppression of women throughout history, as well.
When I look back over
documents and pages
Ancient savageries
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Christened those inflated.
Now it has come to light
the Gods they have slipped up
They forgot about the power
of a woman’s love
In other words, claims the speaker here, a complete and total reevaluation of the
impetus for our moral base must be conducted if we are to truly eradicate the
roots of misogyny from our culture and language.
The refrain contains an example of semiotic hitchhiking, as the “Dragon’s”
speaker tells the audience: “Your dragon needs slaying.” In this case the dragon
represents the prejudice of the male hierarchy against women, which, once slain,
can eradicate prejudiced practices from Judeo-Christian culture. In this case, the
audience being addressed appears to be male, and the terms used to describe
the hierarchy clearly oppose it. Thus, “dragon” appears as a salient variable for
the entextualization of a “feminine” marked stance.
So what? What if the signification process undergoes revision? One might
argue that we have already done this important work if, as Kristeva might say, we
have allowed such language as that in Amos’ lyrics to signify at all in our culture.
One might say we have already shot our language through with its own posited
condition and analyzed the roots of its logic—and even displaced its logic—if we
have understood what Amos “means” in her lyrics. Or one might argue that this
work might not really change our language or the way women figure in our
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society. What difference does it really make to our lives? How does this awkward
transition in thought signify in our language, if at all?
Indeed, there are certain theoretical leaps which must be attended to if we
accept the message in Amos’ lyrics along with their precarious reference to
Butler’s body theory and the linguistic theories of Kristeva, Tannen, and Eckert.
Namely, an acceptance of these theories would entail a rejection of either/or
thinking for both/and thinking—a rejection of the logic of Aristotle and Plato,
which, not without reason, is that of the Judeo-Christian logic very oppressive to
women. This revision of our logic would entail a reevaluation of our morals and
belief systems. And finally, because this reevaluation of these structures might
lead—backwards—into a reevaluation of linguistics and theology, we might even
reevaluate our ideas of how we as a species came to signify at all. We may
revision the concept of deity.
I have argued that connections exist between French feminism on one
hand, and body theory, third-wave feminism, and linguistic theory based in
intertextuality on the other. The nexus for these theories are the stylistic moves
noted by Eckert and Mendoza-Denton in the creation and maintenance and
reinterpretation of identity (Eckert 456; Mendoza-Denton 270). If identity exists as
a collocation of meanings called a “style,” then a “feminine” style might exist
which can be quantified not in essentialist terms.
But not only does this mean that the theorists can bury their hatchets; it
means also that a revision of what it is to be a woman must be accomplished.
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This is the why of Amos’ lyrics; she approaches these questions of the elusive
“feminine” and of the male hierarchy by making just the stylistic moves necessary
to locate the feminine in a space of inclusion and of a certain freedom from the
Judeo-Christian bounds which have made the very of a “feminine” style
distasteful to both men and women alike, for so long.
In my final chapter, I will clarify the implications of jouissance or “revolution
in poetic language” according to Kristeva, and correlate this phenomenon with
Mendoza-Denton’s concept of semiotic hitchhiking, to show that a “feminine”
style rooted in intertextuality might mean certain changes in our way of thinking
about the functionality of the body and its relationship to language, about our
ideas of the body and its relationship to society, and ultimately, about what/who
God might be. Specifically, I will show Kristeva’s notion of the theologization of
the thetic as it pertains to our perception of God, and how this perception has
affected the relationship of the body to language and to our ideas of who should
be doing what work and holding what status in our society, showing that once
Kristeva’s notion of jouissance—alongside Mendoza-Denton’s idea of semiotic
hitchhiking—is employed, these structures crumble, and “lay bare” (Kristeva 7879) the true, historistic relationship between language, functionality, and deity.
Lastly, I will propose a revision of our practices with regard to the functionality of
the body and how it is embodied, or entextualized, through language, to show
that a revision of deity, through language, can mean a certain revision of what we
term as “feminine.”
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CHAPTER THREE
BUTLER, THE SACRED AND THE DISIDENTIFICATION
OF NAMING

I have argued that certain “stylistic moves” (Eckert 458), as explained in
the first chapter, can be styled as “feminine” within localized discourses, and that
these same moves can be utilized as “rallying points for a liberatory contestation”
(qtd. in Sullivan 82) of what “feminine” is and means. In Amos’ lyrics, we can see
such counterhegemonic references to the Bible, sex, marriage, sexuality, gender,
and womanhood. As explained in chapter one, Ochs’ and others view language
as a mode of positioning the self, through “stances” and other “social acts” (337).
According to Ochs, any speech act betrays information about the speaker,
through what Ochs call the linguistic phenomenon of indexicality, whereby a
persona is developed (340). Thus, we might say that Amos’ lyrics provide an
example of localized “social acts” and “stances” that index certain forms of
“femininity.” Further, as Eckert notes, certain “salient” variables might operate
within a “field of potential meanings—an indexical field, or constellation of
ideologically related meanings” (454). This process, called enregistration, links
local linguistic practices/forms with practices in the larger “political economy”
(Eckert 456). As noted in chapter two, Amos refers to certain “social acts,” such
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as “crawling” and “on my knees” (“Girl”), which have a particular context within
the socio-sexual historicity of woman. Further, in “Cloud on My Tongue,” Amos
refers to the salient variable “hair” as she positions herself in the kitchen, a
“stance” that indexes womanhood, thus “creat(ing) a linguistic landscape through
the segmentation of the practices within (her social) terrain” (455). By repeatedly
indexing and segmenting the social terrain of womanhood, Amos illustrates
Mendoza-Denton’s concept of intertextuality, called “entextualization” (269),
which occurs when salient variables come to stand for concepts for which they
were not originally intended, as explicated in chapter one (Amos’ use of Virgin
Mary as a prostitute to comment on the social conditions for women).
Finally, I have shown that Amos’ language usage falls uniquely into that
milieu which Kristeva and other French feminists might term a “feminine”
language or discourse, and that with a thorough examination of Amos’ lyrics, we
might discover an encouraging message about the “feminine” body come to
matter, as Butler suggests. The connection here—between the linguists on one
hand the French feminists on the other—is intertextuality, as explained in the
previous two chapters. When Kristeva says “irruption of the chora,” MendozaDenton says “entextualization.” Mendoza-Denton describes entextualization as
recontextualization of a variable in a context other than originally intended (269),
whereas Kristeva describes the irruption of the chora as an event in which
“[l]anguage thus tends to be drawn out of its symbolic function (sign-syntax) and
is opened out within a semiotic function” (63). In effect, then, Amos’ use of salient
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variables is one example of the entextualization of those variables, wherein the
social constructs behind variables like “hair” and “Virgin Mary,” just to name two,
are laid bare. In this way, Amos’ use of these salient variables is a sociopolitical
act of resistance to hegemonic femininity and an encouragement to women and
to all people yearning for ways to come to matter. This final chapter will elucidate
this affirmation and its implications for our logical systems.

Foreground
I have shown how a revision of French feminist theory, seen through the
lens of current body and linguistic theory, might be used to obtain a relevant
understanding of “feminine” identity and style construction from a theoretical
standpoint. Third-wave feminism has come away from the essentialist argument,
quoted at length in chapter one, that woman “is indefinitely other than herself”
(Irigaray 29) and that any truly “feminine” language would be part of a
“nonthematizable” outside (to which anything feminine would be relegated by to
the stricture of the patronymic order of language and signification). Third wave
feminists and body theorists have arrived at a more measured approach to
gender; specifically, Butler discusses the concept of the “specular woman”—that
which society expects and reiterates—and refutes this identity. Butler argues that
a lessened form of identity has been foisted on women: women are (improper)
copies of a male original. But using Aristetelian logic against Aristotle’s
syllogisms, she presents an alternative to the idea that women are bad copies.

62

Instead, she asserts that “woman” is the original, and that through performativity,
women enact our gender by compulsively mimicking the “specular” (43-45).
As noted in chapter two, Barthes asserts, as “language is
redistributed…two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing
edge…and another edge, mobile, blank, (ready to assume any contours)” (6-7).
Using Becker’s theory that “the actual a-priori of any language event…in an
accumulation of remembered prior texts” (qtd. in Tannen 37), Butler asserts that
gender (i.e., any identity) is an “accumulation of remembered texts,” and if our
positions and even our salient variables are “remembered,” then these “edges” to
which Barthes alludes are political. In other words, moments of “pleasure” in the
text in poetic language have a transformative power. The power of the seeming
il-logic of Amos lyrics could change our worldview. Indeed, there are real-world
implications for the use of these theories in our daily lives, language, and
language practices.
Acceptance of these theories entails a rejection of our rhetorical system of
beliefs and discursive practices, as an outgrowth of rejection of the JudeoChristian oppression of women using religious texts, which have been translated
from Hebrew or Greek, using Aristotelian logic as their basis----which means that
we have to reevaluate our morals and belief systems using a more inclusive
logic. Women, once thought weak, could be strong. Women, once thought to be
bad copies of men, are “original.” Women, once thought illogical, could be logical.
Women, once trying to be more like men to prove their worth, could be in their
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natural bodies, could be valued for their womanliness without any of the
pandering and patronizing.
What would this new logic entail? Tori Amos clearly believes that we
should look at our God again--could He be a She? Could He be a non-gendered
or dual-gendered being? What does this imply for the way that Butler has proved
that our logic bases itself upon the male body as the site of actuality? If a
woman’s body is the site of actuality, how might this change our perceptions of
reality/truth/logic? A detailed analysis of Amos’ lyrics shows us how the woman’s
body as the site of actuality in language might work, and how it might revision our
phallogocentric logic.

Butler and the “Tacit Cruelties” of the Bound Thetic
Much of our current rhetorical systems and laws are based on Aristotelian
syllogisms regarding classification and naming. Through naming and
categorizing, women have been kept “in their place” for thousands of years.
Because Butler offers some very practical interpretation of our current system’s
reliance upon Aristotelian rhetorical hierarchies, and some stunningly simple and
practical advice for a revision of our cultural belief systems, Butler’s theories will
serve here as the mainstay of my resolution to the problem of the “feminine” and
its figuring in our (Western, Judeo-Christian) culture.
Butler bases her theories of gender identity and the “feminine” on the
French feminist theories of Kristeva and Irigaray. As noted in the first chapter,
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Kristeva asserts that poetic language has the potential to displace or “breach” the
thetic, or posited subject, through mimetic language (57), or language that makes
use of the symbolic order. Butler is careful to explain that the “symbolic order,” or
the societally accepted chain of signification, is upheld by proper use and transfer
of ideas and categories from one person to the next, or from generation to
generation.
Butler refers to the symbolic order as a set of “socially contingent rules of
subject-formation,” separate from, but working implicitly with a “set of ‘laws’ or
‘structures’ that constitute the invariant mechanisms of foreclosure through which
any subject comes into being” (190). This law produces what Butler calls
“normativize(d) sexed positionalities,” or genders, and in doing so, “engages the
traumatic production of a sexual antagonism in its symbolic normativity…
rendering culturally abject…(those) cultural organizations of sexuality that exceed
the structuring purview of that law” (190-191). In other words, the construction of
gender is rife with “tacit cruelties” (115) which mean the figurative or cultural
death to those who signify uneasily within the symbolic order. Furthermore,
Butler notes, “the risk, of course, is that contingent regulatory mechanisms of
subject-production may be reified as universal laws, exempted from the very
process of discursive rearticulation that they occasion” (191). The danger is that
a society has no frame with which to evaluate its own laws of signification; hence,
these “tacit(ly) (cruel)” laws are simply reiterated, handed down from
automatically from our forefathers.
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The idea that discursive practice might be exempt from critique is not new;
Kristeva, too, notes this cultural exemption in her notion of sacrifice and the
theologization of the thetic:
The sacred—sacrifice—which is found in every society, is, a
theologization of the thetic, itself structurally indispensible to the
positing of language. This theologization takes on different forms
depending on the degree of development of the society’s
productive forces. It represents either the signifying process’
dependence on natural forces and the surrounding ecological
system, or its subordination to the social relations between subjects
caught in kinship relations (78).
Kristeva refers here to discursive patterns such as the functionality of the body
and its relationship to language in our society. The thetic is bound through
sacrifice—through what Kristeva calls the “positing of violence” or the “bound(ing)
of the thetic” (78)—to constrain discursive practices, including those that
represent gender. Just as Butler notes, these discursive practices and the laws
that order them are not examined; rather, they are simply reiterated, and what is
more, they are viewed as somehow “sacred.” Yet, Butler, like Amos, I would
argue, agrees the time has come to question this tacit ostracism from the male
chain of signification.
Particularly, in Amos’ “Pancake,” the speaker refers very plainly to the
sacred enacted by Judeo-Christian religion, in which she places strategic
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references to the discursive power of the notion of sacrifice: “Seems like you and
your tribe/ decided you’d rewrite the law/ segregate the mind/ from Body from
Soul.” Here, the speaker blatantly refers to the dissection of the maternal body
from iteration, and calls for “A change of course in/ our direction/ a dash of truth/
spread thinly” in the face of Christianity’s misogyny and homophobia. Finally, the
speaker in “Pancake” seems to refer to the force of iteration that women have
experienced through exclusion from the divine will:
Oh Zion please
remove your glove
and dispel every
trace
Of His spoken word
That has lodged
In my vortex
Here, the speaker asks for Christianity to leave her consciousness. Finally, the
speaker indicts the male world and God for this exclusion: “You could have
spared/ her — oh but no/ Messiahs need/ people dying in their name.” Here, in a
sense, the speaker indicts God for using a male figure rather than a female one
for the sacrifice, and for allowing the implications of the Messiah’s gender to be
conflated by the patriarchy throughout history. “Why a male? Why allow this?”
she seems to ask. Because the naming of the Messiah is a patriarchal sacrifice,
which correlates to Kristeva’s notion of the sacrifice, we have been constantly
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aware of the male examples of such a sacrifice (epic heroes are almost always
male, and when thinking of heroes, we tend to think only of male firefighters,
male police officers, and male soldiers as committing sacrificial deeds), while
being inept to the force of iteration of female sacrifice, which has been enacted
for years, without being recognized as such (Mary, virgin sacrifice). Thus, any
mimesis of this sacrifice which is effected by women is not read as sacrifice; it is
something else, something Other. Thus, we cannot “thematize” the tears of the
Virgin of Guadalupe or of the candy skull. We reproduce them compulsively in
pop culture, hoping that they will reveal themselves to our consciousness, but
because they do not represent a male sacrifice, we cannot fathom the sadness of
the Virgin. Why, pretty girl? What sadness? What speaking (“feminine”) subject?
It is this theoretical leap, from the vision of the Divine—and by extension, the
Divine sacrifice—as male, to the vision of the Divine and the Divine sacrifice as
female/Other, which Amos’ lyrics utter into existence.

The Sacred Act of Naming
As Butler writes, one cannot deny the violence inherent in the act of
naming. By naming and constraining gender, discursive practice enacts a “‘chain’
of iteration” that cannot be divorced from historicity (Butler 187). Thus, gender is
not “performative” in the sense that the subject chooses to enact its gender;
rather, gender is constrained by a set of discursive practices that allow or
disallow a particular body to be intelligible, conceivable, or uttered at all (187). In
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other words, gender performativity, or any performativity, is a “forced reiteration
of norms” (94). What this means is that any identity definition is conditioned by its
“outside.” The violence inherent in naming is, then, the erasure, or cultural death,
of any phenomenon that occurs outside the norm. This violence is a cultural
refusal to recognize, or, to quote Kristeva, to “thematize” that which exists
outside the norm—in effect, to deny the existence of the referent altogether.
Yet, as Butler writes, “the constitutive outside means that identity always
requires precisely that which it cannot abide” (188). To create a coherent
gendered image of what is “woman,” there must be an image of what is not. Any
identity formation includes what Butler calls “the abasement through which
coherence is fictively produced and sustained” (115). Butler continues,
Something on this order is at work most obviously in the production
of coherent heterosexuality, but also in the production of coherent
lesbian identity, coherent gay identity, and within those worlds, the
coherent butch, the coherent femme. In each of these cases, if
identity is constructed through opposition, it is also constructed
through rejection. It may be that if a lesbian opposes
heterosexuality absolutely, she may find herself more in its power
that a straight or bisexual woman who knows or lives its constitutive
instability. And if a butchness requires a strict opposition to
femmeness, is this a refusal of an identification or is this an
identification with femmeness that has already been made, made
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and disavowed, a disavowed identification that sustains the butch,
without which the butch qua butch cannot exist? (115).
In other words, simply to negate the existence of opposing subject-positions
might not be enough to explain or to guarantee the status of a referent; indeed, at
some times, the denial of the opposition does as much damage to one ideology
as it does to its opposing ideology. I quote this passage at length because it
illustrates the central point I am trying to make about how our logic at this
moment in history relies on either/or thinking. There is, in our way of thinking, as
Butler states, “either ‘A’ or ‘not A’” (35-37); nevertheless, one can see the
problems with this logic.
What Butler recommends is not a simple rejection of Aristotelian (either/or)
logic and its replacement with both/and logic, however. What Butler advocates is
rather a reworking of our system of “repudiation… subordination…or exploitative
relation” (118). Sometimes, in this new system of logic, “A” might mean the
existence of a “not A,” but in others, “A” might entail a “sometimes A.”
Butler refers to the term “women” as a “political signifier,” and notes that
No signifier can be radically representative, for every signifier is the
site of a perpetual méconnaissance, it produces the expectation of
a unity, a full and final recognition that can never be achieved.
Paradoxically, the failure of such signifiers—“women” is the one
that comes to mind—fully to describe the constituency they name is
precisely what constitutes these signifiers as sites of phantasmatic
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investment and discursive rearticulation. It is what opens the
signifier to new meanings and new possibilities for political
resignification. It is this open-ended and performative function of
the signifier that seems to me to be crucial to a radical democratic
notion of futurity (191).
In other words, the only way to avoid a “paralysis” in terms of signification with
regard to identity politics is to take into account not only the historicity of a word,
but also its possibilities, its future (193). Butler argues that conceiving of identity
as a uniform entity treats it as an end, when it should instead be the means to a
greater end. Instead, identity, she argues, should be a jumping-off point for a
reexamination of our discursive practices.
Butler advocates an “anti-descriptivist view of naming” which might see
the name as possibly “designat(ing) a contingent and open organizing principle
for the formation of political groups,” thus “provid(ing) a linguistic theory for an
anti-essentialist identity politics” (208). From this perspective, one must admit
that any attempt to unify a multiply-constituted referent through a signifier is
“phantasmatic” and, thus, functions as a “disidentification.” In this case, Butler
argues, “politics holds out the promise of the manageability of unspeakable loss”
(209), to perform rather than to represent identity or any ideological formation
(210).
In the view of Jacques Lacan, “‘(t)he essentially performative character of
naming is the precondition for all hegemony and politics’” (qtd. in Butler 211).
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Yet, Butler notes, it is this moment in signification that gives way to what she
calls a “radical democratic politics” (210) because, “if the process of naming
objects amounts to the very act of their formation, then their descriptive features
will be fundamentally unstable and open to all kinds of hegemonic rearticulations”
(210). Butler observes: “It is of no small significance that proper names are
derived from the paternal dispensation of its own name, and that the performative
power of the paternal signifier to ‘name’ is derived from the function of the
patronym” (211). Indeed, the act of naming is, according to Saul Kripke, a
discursive practice—the “fixing of the referent”—which can be traced back to the
Bible, to the original naming that God performed on Adam (qtd. in Butler 212). In
this way, naming is a citational practice, “a reiteration of the divine process of
naming, whereby naming the son inaugurates his existence within the divinely
sanctioned community of man” (212).
The implications of this view of naming are crucial to our understanding of
“women” as a multiple referent; if “women” is something “outside” which cannot
be named, and whose constituents receive no named continuation of the
patriarchal line, then “women” are seen, even linguistically, as existing outside
the divine community of man sanctioned by God. Women not sanctioned by
God?
According to Kripke, language users are bound by a “chain of normative
usage,” indicating, through naming, a “causal link” which normativizes their
“intention” (qtd. in Butler 213). In this process, Kripke specifically names the act
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of baptism as a discursive practice to mark the naming of a subject (qtd. in Butler
214). In this way, the act of naming secures a place for the referent within the
divine will of God; Butler comments that
It appears to follow, then, that the fixing of the referent is the
forcible production of that fictive homogeneity, and, indeed, of that
community: the agreement by which the referent becomes fixed (an
agreement which is a continual agreeing again that happens over
time) is itself reproduced on the condition that the reference is fixed
in some way…it is the reiteration of the divine performative and,
perhaps also, the extension of the divine will in its uniformity, then it
is God the father who patronymically extends his putative kingdom
through the recursive fixing of the referent (qtd. in Butler 214).
Thus, naming of people and objects, such as baptism or even conferring upon a
multiply-constituted group a particular name (such as that of “women”), is an act
which reiterates the notion of what God thematizes. Thus, naming functions as a
theologization of the thetic.
Amos refers to this theologization of the thetic in “Muhammed, My Friend,”
wherein the speaker suggests that the Messiah was actually a woman:
Muhammad my friend
it’s time to tell the world
we both know it was a girl back in Bethlehem
and on that fateful day
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when she was crucified
she wore Shiseido red and we drank tea
by her side
Here, the speaker refutes the idea of male sacrifice and the male sacred order. In
a patriarchal society, there must a patrilinear blood-line, in which there must be a
sacred son, not a sacred daughter.
As Butler notes, the sacred order is promoted and continued through “rigid
designation,” combined with “patronymic production and transmission of a
uniformity of intention.” In this way, it is possible to “secure the lines of this
transmission through time through the production of stable kinship, that is, strict
lines of patrilineality…and through the exclusion of catachresis” (215). What is
significant to my thesis in this remark is that all these totems, so to speak, must
be in place to achieve the continuation of patrilineality, but alongside the
exclusion of catachresis: the very phenomenon which makes jouissance possible
in language must be excluded in order to exert the theologization of the thetic.

The Performative Power of the Name
According to Butler, the “performative power of the name…cannot be
isolated from the paternal economy within which it operates, and the powerdifferential between the sexes that institutes and serves” (216). But using
Kripke’s notion that “‘the referent’ depends essentially on those catachrestic acts
of speech that either fail to refer or refer in the wrong way” (Butler 217), Butler
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argues that this im-proper naming of things can open possibilities for new
meanings (218). Butler indirectly deals with the question of what happens when a
woman, member of the catachrestically identified group “women,” speaks: she
argues that the term “women” as an identifier “will gain and lose its stability to the
extent that it remains differentiated and that differentiation serves political goals”
(218). But Butler resists the temptation to categorize “women” as the lost
referent. Instead she argues that “(t)o call into question women as the privileged
figure of ‘the lost referent,’ however, is precisely to recast that description as a
possible signification, and to open the term as site for a more expansive
rearticulation” (218).
But the danger is that danger which is so easily gleaned from reading
Irigaray’s description of “women,” quoted at length in chapter one, which poses
that a woman is “always something other than herself.” Butler argues that “if
women are positioned as that which cannot exist, as that which is barred from
existence by the law of the father, then there is a conflation of women with that
foreclosed existence, that lost referent, which is surely as pernicious as any form
of ontological essentialism” (219). Butler argues that the answer is to “make the
signifier into a site for a set of rearticulations that cannot be predicted or
controlled, and to provide for a future in which constituencies will form that have
not yet had a site for such an articulation or which ‘are’ not prior to the siting of
such a site” (219).
Amos herself refers to the patronymy of naming. In “Crazy,” the speaker
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refers to the fall of Eve, which places her, and all women, in the subjective
position.
Not sayin’
Not charmed at all
Not sayin’
that you weren’t worth
the fall
Next, the speaker refers to the “real” that Butler also notes, from Foucault and
Žižek:
So I let Crazy
take a spin
Then I let Crazy
settle in
Kicked off my shoes
Shut reason out
He said ‘’first let’s just
unzip your religion
down’
The speaker lets herself be subsumed under the term “women” by patronymic
naming and ideas of the specular woman. But, she resists this naming, naming
resistance “crazy.” In other words, any rejection of patronymic naming is seen as
insanity, because it is outside the thematizable. The speaker’s identity—
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“women”—constitutes what Žižek terms the “real” (207), what is unsanctioned by
the patronymic and, by proxy, divine, discursive practice of naming. In order to
reject it, she must “unzip (her) religion,” which has placed her logistically, and,
therefore, theologically, outside divine will.
Finally, the speaker refers to naming:
Found that I
I craved at all
Saw me melt
into your
native shelter
Where you carved my
name
Paper tigers scare
and came
Alive
When the speaker comes to “crave,” or speak, at all, she speaks as a “lost
referent” who must “melt into (her) native shelter,” womanhood—a seemingly
subconscious, a-priori linguistic and discursive practice of occupying a certain
thematizable sexed, sociopolitical position in society—in order to signify.
Signifying as a woman is a somehow half-signification.
Further, “paper tigers scare,” meaning something that seems so harmless,
like a name, can be threatening. And yet, she notes these paper tigers
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came alive
through the dawn
through the light
through the time
when you said
you could
drive all night
In other words, the name of “women” must be reopened, as Butler argues, to
new signification:
Heard that you were once
‘Temptation’s Girl’
And as soon
as you have
rearranged the mess
in your head
He will show up looking
sane
perfectly sane
If I know Crazy
In other words, “women,” having born the signification of original sin, can reopen
the term “women,” reifying the term, giving the term a futurity that contradicts its
historicity—a notion which, in itself, demonstrates the new logic entailed by an
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acceptance of the theories I orchestrate in this thesis. Amos argues that if we
“rearrange the (logical) mess in (our) head(s),” “Crazy,” the named
personification of the “real”—what is currently seen as insanity because it is
outside the thematizable—will look “perfectly sane.”
In fact, an improvisation Amos performed on Radio Uno Italy on October
16, 2002, further emphasizes the theme of naming found in these lyrics:
tell me
do you see
the same face
when I say the name
crazy
tell me
do you see
the same face
when I say his name
Here the speaker reiterates the (patronymic) discursive practice of naming in
order to subvert its patronymic claim over her identity. She effectively pokes
holes in the process of naming and all of its innate structures and consequences.
Butler argues that “failure of identification is the point of departure for a
more democratizing affirmation of internal difference” (219). By asking what the
audience sees when she says “his name,” the speaker alludes to the very
disidentification to which Butler continually refers. If “Crazy” is the resistance to
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the thematizable, then to understand “crazy” is to understand the “real,” the
constitutive outside. Indeed, she argues that “through a certain insistent citing of
the signifier…a repetition compulsion at the level of signification…an iterable
practice that shows that what one takes to be a political signifier is itself the
sedimentation of prior signifiers…” (219-220).
Amos refers very plainly, it seems, to a reopening of signification in “Iiiii.”
First the speaker starts with wordplay, an element of jouissance, “With your E's/
And your ease/ And I do one more,” referring next to the patronymy and its hold
on language:
Need a lip gloss boost
In your America
Is it God's
Is it yours
Sweet saliva
Here, the speaker asks for an end to patronymic traditions in language and
signification, quipping that our discursive practices here in America need a “lip
gloss boost,” possibly even referring to an “instinctual glossolalia” much like what
Irigaray describes as a more woman-centered language. Next, she calls the
theologization of the thetic to task by asking if “saliva” belongs to God. Has God
ordained the naming of saliva, as such?
Next, the speaker refers to Kristeva’s notion of linguistic sacrifice, and the
effect of cultural abjection:
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I know we're dying
And there's no sign of a parachute
We scream in cathedrals
Why can't it be beautiful
Why does there
Gotta be a sacrifice
Here the speaker asks why patronymic signification must result in exclusion.
Jouissance is in effect here, indicated by wordplay and inclusion rather an
exclusion. Further, the speaker refers to patronymic threat of hellfire, the ultimate
expression of the constitutive outside which, in this thesis, signifies a place
outside the divine plan, as she asks God to “Just say yes/ You little arsonist/
You're so sure you can save/ Every hair on my chest.”
Next, Amos seems to encourage a rejection of our rhetorical system of
beliefs and discursive practices and a rejection of the Judeo-Christian oppression
of women through religious doctrine and theologized discursive practices. In
“Virginia,” Amos refers to a woman, Virginia (a personification of the state of
Virginia):
she may betray
all that she loves
and even wait
for their
Savior
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to come
Here the woman, Virginia, “can’t remember (her) name” after she has given up all
that she loves, waiting “for their Savior to come.” Amos seems to argue that the
time to change our signification of women is urgently approaching, as
(Virginia) loses
a little each
day
to ghetto pimps
and presidents
who try and
arouse
her turquoise
serpents
She can’t recall
what they represent
and when you
ask, she won’t know
Here, although Virginia has not completely been broken down (or taken over) by
the patrilinear logic—“she can’t recall/ what they represent”—she “loses a little
each day.” And yet, she “lay(s) down her Body/ covering him all the same.” This
reference to “covering” bears eerie resemblance to Butler’s discussion of the
catachresis inherent in the naming of a multiply constituted category such as
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“women.”

Agency and Performative Power
Butler argues that “to take up the political signifier (which is always a
matter of taking up a signifier by which one is oneself already taken up,
constituted, initiated) is to be taken into a chain of prior usages, to be installed in
the midst of significations that cannot be situated in terms of clear origins or
ultimate goals” (219). As clarified in chapter one, because of this instability,
Butler argues that agency can never be understood as a controlling authorship
over that signifying chain, and it cannot be the power, once installed and
constituted in and by that chain, to set a sure course for its future;” rather, agency
in this light is what Butler describes as a
‘chain’ of signification (which) operates through a certain insistent
citing of the signifier, an iterable practice whereby the political
signifier is perpetually resignified, a repetition compulsion at the
level of signification…(wherein) what one takes to be a political
signifier is itself the sedimentation of prior signifiers, the effect of
their reworking (220).
Butler asserts that to use a term such as “women” or “queer” is to “install a (false)
identity through repetition,” a term which acts as a “disloyalty against identity—a
catachresis…a disloyalty that works the iterability of the signifier for what remains
non-self-identical in any invocation of identity, namely, the iterable or temporal
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conditions of its own possibility” (220).
This concept of a “disloyal” signifier is what is being employed when
Virginia covers “him.” Although she knows she is not being fairly described, she
uses her Body (with a capital “B”—to indicate that the female body is being
reopened to divine will?) to smooth over the rough spots in signification, to reach
an uneasy peace, wherein she, as the lost referent, is sacrificed, linguistically,
physically, and theologically.
This theological and linguistic sacrifice is addressed very clearly in “Mary,”
in which Mary, the virgin Mother, acts as a catachresis for “women” within divine
will. Here the speaker laments the way in which the divinity of Mary has been
cheapened by efforts to find a culturally-readable image for women: “everybody
wants you, sweetheart/ everybody got a dream of glory/ Las Vegas got a pin-up
girl/ they got her armed as they buy and sell her.” But instead of sexualizing or
cheapening the image of Mary (in order to deny or denigrate the divine in
“women”), as Las Vegas has done, the speaker wants to reopen her signification.
Oh Mary, can you hear me?
Mary, you’re bleeding
Mary, don’t be afraid
we’re just waking up
and I hear help is on the way
Clearly, the speaker here believes that the Judeo-Christian community is ready
for a new perspective on Mary, her divinity, and the ordination of women within
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divine will. The speaker laments, “When I think of what they’ve done to you/ oh
Mary, can you hear me?” arguing that “Butterflies don’t belong in nets.” Here the
signification of the butterfly is that of linguistic and theological sacrifice; Mary, and
the cultural signification of all women, has been sacrificed; and yet, promises the
speaker, “help is on the way… ‘cause even the wind/ cries your name.” Here the
speaker seems to refer to Luke 19:40, in which Jesus tells his disciples that even
if they did not praise him, “the rocks would cry out” (ESV). Amos’ allusion to this
verse here is a literal call to nature to “cry out” against the denigration of Mary,
who she argues is a feminine divinity which has been excised and excluded by
Judeo-Christian patronymy due to her femininity.

Reopening Terms: “Women” and “Queer”
Butler argues that the “failure of the signifier to produce the unity it
appears to name is not the result of an existential void, but the result of that
term’s incapacity to include the social relations that it provisionally stabilizes
through a set of contingent exclusions” (221). Further, she assets that to attempt
to quantify a multiply-constituted category naming is futile; “that there can be no
final or complete inclusivity is thus a function of the complexity and historicity of a
social field that can never be summarized by any given description, and that, for
democratic reasons, ought never to be” (221). Thus, she argues, “non-referential
terms (such as) ‘women’ and ‘queer’ institute provisional identities and,
inevitably, a provisional set of exclusions,” which “creates the expectation that a
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full and final enumeration of features is possible (221). This fallacious
expectation “orients identity politics toward a full confession of the contents of
any given identity category” (221), resulting in what Butler calls “foreclosure”
(221).
But, according to Butler, it is this foreclosure which allows the (affirmation)
of the “anti-descriptivist perspective as the open and democratizing potential of
the category” (221). Thus, Butler argues, to “ameliorate and rework this violence,
it is necessary to learn a double movement: to invoke the category and, hence,
provisionally to institute an identity and at the same time to open the category as
a site of permanent political contest” (222), in order to “perpetually interrogate the
exclusions by which it proceeds” and “to learn to live the contingency of the
political signifier in a culture of democratic contestation” (222).
But, Butler asks, how does a term like “queer” come to be an acceptable
term, given its historicity? “Is this a simple reversal of valuations such that ‘queer’
means either a past degradation or a present or future affirmation?....When and
how does a term like ‘queer’ become subject to an affirmative resignification for
some when a term like ‘nigger,’ despite some recent efforts at reclamation,
appears only capable of reinscribing its pain?” (223). Further, she asks, “How is it
that those who are abjected come to make their claim through and against the
discourses that have sought their repudiation?” (224).
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Butler, in answer to her own queries, argues that “‘queering’ persists as a
defining moment of performativity” because “(p)erformative acts are forms of
authoritative speech…that, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and
exercise a binding power5” (225). Further, Butler notes that “if the power of
discourse to produce that which it names is linked with the question of
performativity, then the performative is one domain in which power acts as
discourse” (225). Thus, there is no power as such, argues Butler, but rather,
there is the citational act which is “a nexus of power and discourse that repeats
of mimes the discursive gestures of power” (225). It is not the speaker who
exercises power in this situation—“it is the power of the citation that gives the
performative its binding or conferring power… the citational legacy by which a
contemporary ‘act’ emerges in the context of a chain of binding conventions”
(225).

The Forming of a (Logical) Subject
“(R)ecognition is not conferred upon a subject, but forms that subject”
(Butler 226). I have attempted to reconcile here the idea that a subject can be
constituted by a society that decides it for itself and bounds it, borders it, as it
were, into a cage, just like the butterfly in “Mary,” with the idea that women, as

5

Such an argument is (however hidden) at the heart of the gay marriage debate, for example. Because a
marriage certificate and the conferral of a marriage license is a performative and authoritative act that
“exercises(s) a binding power,” people (actually very correctly) see the act as an important signifier in our
culture, because it represents a discursive pattern change.
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speaking subjects, can change the conception of what we are as a multiplyconstituted referent. Summatively, I have used Butler’s ideas to show that we are
constituted in and by the logic of the signifier and by the logic of the signifying
chain itself. I have, finally, reached the conclusion that a new logic is necessary
in order to conceive of a new category of “women” in our society.
Might we revisit a “generative” logic such as that of Bahktin? Is not such a
logic, in fact, exactly that to which Butler points when she writes about the
opening of possibilities and linguistic “futures” for terms of identification? Butler
argues that a term such as “queer,” “through repeated invocation…become(s)
linked to accusation, pathologization, insult,” and over time, forms “a social bond
among homophobic communities” (226). But Butler argues next that such a bond
necessitates a certain “turn against this constitutive historicity” (227). I argue here
that such a bond works in much the same way in which the constitutive outside
works: such a community created through language use also creates the
community shamed by such a usage. The co-opting/reversal/reclamation of the
term “bitch” is a prime example. In the case of both “queer” and “bitch,” I argue
that these terms can be seen, referring back to Mendoza-Denton, as “semiotic
hitchhikers,” which have been “entextualized” and transformed (270). Indeed, her
description of the effects of “creak” are eerily similar to the roles of the usage of
the terms “queer” and “bitch:” “distinguishing the (identity of the speaker’s)
voices;…in orienting the narrator in the moral landscape of the events;…(in)
cu(ing) differences in participants and points of view” (269). Here, the term
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“women,” chosen by Butler as one of her cases in point, follows suit in its
subjectivity to entextualization and re-entextualization, as it were.
“And yet,” she notes, such an “interrogation of those constitutive and
exclusionary relations of power through which contemporary discursive
resources are formed…is crucial to the continuing democratization of queer
politics” (227) because “it constitutes a self-critical dimension within activism”
(227). In other words, Butler argues that we must allow an ongoing interrogation
of these terms to keep them “fresh.”
A key point of my thesis is that an end to the oppression of women using
religious texts translated from Hebrew or Greek, using Aristotelian logic as their
basis, compels a reevaluation of our morality and belief systems using a more
inclusive logic, such as the logic so ingeniously detailed by Butler and so
cunningly employed in the lyrics of Amos. Mendoza-Denton mentions, in her
discussion of “creak,” intonational shadow in the narrative of Don Gabriel in an
article by Jane Hill, which “breaks the narrative down in to a Bakhtinian interplay
of voices” (269). Such a narrative provides Mandoza-Denton with a key piece in
her analysis of “creak,” and here also provides a key example of the kind of logic
necessitated by my discussion of Kristeva’s notion of jouissance and its
connection with Butler’s notion of an expansive democratization of the political
signifier “women” and “queer.”
It is this very democratization of the signifier “feminine” which I attempt to
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accomplish in my thesis. Maybe it is time to reopen the signifier “feminine.” By
keeping in mind Butler’s cautionary tale against foreclosure and her advocacy of
the democratization of the signifier for the multiply-constituted referent, while
giving proper attention to the moments of jouissance, of catachresis, of improper
sense and semiotic hitchhiking in signification, it is possible to reach a nonessentialist and non-descriptivist conception of the term “feminine.” The term
“feminine” is a term with a rich historicity, and while it is not necessary or possible
to deny this historicity, it may, as Butler argues, be possible to “learn to live the
contingency” of the category of “women,” “queer,” or “feminine.”
The women of Amos’ lyrics contain all of those versions of “feminine”
which have been foreclosed, conflated and used as “sutures” which, according to
Zižek, disidentify and “cover over” the catechresis associated with collective
terms (qtd. in Butler 195) like “women.” From their various subject positions—
bitch, prostitute, virgin, lesbian, mother, daughter, girl, woman, wife, divorcée,
porn star—they utter collectively that which has been catechristically
disidentified. Moreover, Amos lyrics expose those hidden functions of language,
bringing to light the misogyny of Western language and language practices
because of their theologization, reinforced through Judeo-Christian religious
doctrine. And finally, Amos’ lyrics revision for us a self-aware, powerful, spiritual
category of women who are infused with a divinity denied them in the past. In
“Cloud on My Tongue,” the speaker wishes this kind of fulfillment for all women:
You're already in there
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I'll be wearing your tattoo
You're already in there
Thought I was over the bridge now
I'm already in
Circles and circles and circles again
The girl's in
Circles and circles
Got to stop spinning
Circles and circles and circles again
Thought I was over the bridge now
Here, as she speaks first from the perspective of the woman who successfully
gotten “over the bridge,” and next from the perspective of the girl who is still
“spinning,” the speaker of the song identifies the kind of reassurance all women
can have once they have moved past the shame of the wound and the selfhatred inflicted upon femaleness, “femininity,” and womanhood by the JudeoChristian concept of original sin and the functionality of the female body,
reopening the term “women”—and even the term “feminine”—to new possibilities.

Afterword
Is it possible that the terms “feminine” and “women” can be newly
conceived? Butler asserts that it is to be done only by using these terms, to allow
them to be on the tongues and on the minds of people, to be redefined locally
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and “redistributed,” much in the way that Mendoza-Denton or Barthes might
suggest. Through entextualization of the salient variable, “feminine,” we might
begin to see small changes over time, which might stem to larger changes over a
longer period. But first, as a culture—beginning with feminists, I would argue—we
must reclaim the word “feminine” from its historicity. Many women, even as
feminists, are guilty of misuse and of pejorative use of the word “feminine” and of
the term “woman.” To reclaim these terms, we must again become comfortable
with difference all over again: women are not men. We are women, we are
“femme”-inine. We are women. To begin, we must confront Judeo-Christian and
Aristotelian prejudice against women wherever we find it, and we must speak out
in resistance. We must point out these prejudices to other women and to men,
wherever we find them. And we must broadcast, as Butler suggests in her
discussion of “anti-descriptivist perspective” (221), that difference can be a
starting point for open discussion.
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